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INTRODUCTION

Problem
A very eminent scholar of war and peace, Raymond
Aron, once said:

"Relations between sovereign states may

be more or less bellicose; they are never essentially or
1
ultimately peaceful."
Although the remark can hardly be
contested, the curious questions of why conflicts (i.e.,
especially international conflicts between foreign nations)
are so pervasive and what causal

2

conditions bring such

conflicts into being are questions which have not been
adequately resolved, and for that matter may never be,
"Conflict, of course, is inherent in the nature of man."^
But this does not necessarily negate our efforts in
attempting to resolve such questions.

History provides us

with the raw material for analysis and study of conflict
and conflict avoidance, but often times this analysis is

^Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, N.Y.:
day, 1959),'p. 1 8 .

Double

For a splendid discussion of "social causation"
and the concept of causality, see R. M. Maclver, Social
Causation (New York:
Harper and Row, 1942)',
^Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Toward a Strategy of
Peace (New York:
Rand McNally, 1965), P« 47.
1

2

lacking in perspective; and has to some degree been confused
with the study of crisis behavior.

A significant fact to \

realize concerning a crisis is that ” . . . it occurs as the)
result of failure of decision-making at much earlier
/

stages.”*1' The Cuban missile crisi^ was no exception.
This research project has been addressed to the
problem of answering several questions concerning the
crisis that, in this author's opinion, have remained wholly
unresolved and inadequately answered.

The Cuban missile

crisis of 1962 has been described by one foreign policy
strategist in the following manner?
Few will deny that the recent establishment of a
Communist government in Cuba, coupled with the
decision of the Soviet Union to invest almost a
billion dollars in the creation of a strategic
missile base for the first time beyond the borders
of its contiguous satellites, produced the most
serious crisis of the nuclear age.5 (Italics mine.)
Robert Osgood has described the crisis in a somewhat
different perspective?

”. . .

the Cuban Crisis grew out of

grossly erroneous estimates of national interests and
behavior between states with years of hard experience in

^J, ¥. Burton, Systems. States, Diplomacy, and
Rules (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1968J,
P» 239.
^Robert D„ Crane, "The Cuban Crisis,” Orbis, VI
(Winter 1963), 528,
This view of the magnitude of the
crisis is commonly held by many writers, most notable of
these being Bernard Brodie, Thomas S chelling, Herman Kahn,
Arnold Horelick, and Herbert Dinerstein.

3
confronting each o t h e r ( T h a t

this crisis brought the

bipolar nuclear powers "eyeball-to-eyeball"

7

in the first

nuclear Cold War confrontation is a well-known facto

What

is not clearly understood is why Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev
attempted such an adventurous and risky scheme*:
^Directly related to the reasons for Khrushchev’s
placement of strategic, offensive missiles in Cuba are his
calculations of the possibilities and probabilities that
such an action, H e , ,

deployment of missiles in Cuba, either

would provoke a hostile and aggressive response from the
United States involving great risks of retaliation, or that
the act of implacing missiles in Cuba would involve only a
marginal degree of risk, associated with maximum gains from
g
......
penetration of the U.S.'s core interest, and only a verbal
.............

show of force by the U,S,

....

.

These calculations bring into

question the state of American foreign policy and deterrence
strategy^

It can be assumed that in any international

Robert F» Osgood, Force, Order, and Justice
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 19671, p« 156*
?This particular comment was attributed to McGeorge
Bundy, who was a member of President Kennedy’s special
"think tank" committee of the National Security Council
during the actual crisis of October 1962,
See for example
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days?
A Memoir of the Cuban
Missile Crisis (New York: W . I , Norton, 1969).
~

■r"

v

^Traditionally, a core interest has always involved
a geographical area deemed so vital to the security of a
given nation-state that it would consider a threat to that
area as a threat to its own security.
The Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 bears out this relationship.

4
conflict the respective aggressors and deterrers base their
political maneuvers and military postures on certain
definable strategies, calculations, and objectives to be
achieved--be they political or military**^

^oviet pre-crisis

calculations of probable U 0S 0 behavior were based on some
of the following criteria? informational signals, words and
actions of executive leadership, past performance in inter
national affairs,

employment of force, images, and U 0S 0

resolve!
"The international system,” according to Kenneth
Boulding, "consists of a group of interacting ’nations1
or ’countries*1

Since the international system is com-

posed of a group of interacting nations

11

involving recip

rocal relations between political entities, where each
nation bases its decisions and policies towards the others
on certain value patterns, such as interpretation of
images, actions and words of statesmen, and expectations,
then(it is a truism to say that it is what nations’ leaders
^For the sake of brevity in my Introduction, I
will define only those terms essential to the reader’s
understanding* Chapter I will be devoted to a more elabo
rate explanation of terms*
1D

Kenneth E, Boulding, "National Images and the
International System," in William C. Olson and Fred A,*
Sondermann, The Theory and Practice of International Rela 
tions (2do ed„; Englewood Cliffs, N*J*:
Prentice-Hall,

T966), p„ 52*
^ T h e term "interacting nation" will be discussed
in Chapter I (see i nf r a , pp* 22-24)*

5
think the world is like, not what it is really like, that
determines their behavior,,

12

"The image is always_in some

sense a product of messages received in the pastpJJ^
{.The importance of national images can be clearlyunderstood when we attempt to provide a logical explana
tion for Khrushchev’s deployment of missiles in Cuba in
1962.

A question often asked after the event and as often

tentatively answered was:

What was the Soviet purpose or

objective in putting in the missiles?

Rarely asked, but

more urgent for future policy guidance,

is the question:

What did we do to make them think we would let them get
away with it?

To this specific question, this research

project is addressed
Hypothesis and Research Design
pin a television interview not long after the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962, President John F. Kennedy observed
that both the U . S . and the Soviet Union had made a serious
miscalculation in the Cuban affair,

”1 d o n ’t think we

expected that he [Khrushchev] would put the missiles in
Cuba,” he said, ”because it would have seemed such an
<4✓* C f ., Ross S'tagner, The Psychological Aspects of
International Conflict (Belmont, Calif,:
Brooks/Cole
Publishing Company, 1962), especially chapts, 1-6,
Here
he discusses such concepts as ’’projection, overloading and
the self-fulfilling prophecy,”
^ Bould in g,

ojc, c i t , , p, 53®

6

imprudent action for him to take,

. „ „ He obviously

thought he could do it in secret and that the United States
would accept it.”

1h>

Obviously Khrushchev did think that

he could do it, and such calculations were based on certain
assumptions he had formed concerning the behavior of the
U.S. government, its nuclear deterrence strategy, its
credibility, and its young President--John F. Kennedy^
That deterrence strategy did in fact fail to deter
the Soviet Union from placing offensive missiles in Cuba,
which has been traditionally and geographically a U.S.
sphere of influence and a recognized core interest of the
U.S., is well known.

I think Bernard Brodie best described

the ineffectiveness of American deterrence strategy when
he said:
Actually, the greatest single challenge to the
status quo, the greatest "failure of deterrence"-though we must avoid confusing an occasionally
necessary confrontation with failure of deterrence-was precisely the Cuban Crisis of October 1962. . . . 5
Specifically, this thesis will attempt to answer
the following questions:
1.

Wh y did deterrence strategy fail?

2.

What led Khrushchev to believe he could

successfully deploy missiles in Cuba?
^ W a s h i n g t o n P o s t . December 1S, 1962.
^ B e r n a r d Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear
(Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1966)
p. 52.
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Hypothesis Statement
/ Since this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that
»A.vua-

the cause of the missile crisis can be attributed to rthe
"failure of deterrence," it is necessary to explain what
deterrence

16

is, ho w it is used, and what its psychologi

cal functions are .'"'j
This thesis will focus on American deterrence
strategy as stated and implemented during the Kennedy
Administration.

This strategy will be evaluated for its

relevance to serve as a deterrent*

To evaluate American

deterrence strategy, a deterrence model

17

will be con

structed from the major deterrence theories that prevailed
at the time of the crisis.

This model will be a synthesis

of the primary elements that comprise deterrence strategy.
1

Deterrence has been defined by many writers.
Glenn S’nyder's definition is highly descriptive and quali
tative:
"Deterrence is a species of political power.
It
is the capacity to induce others to do things or not to do
things which they would not otherwise do or refrain from
doing; deterrence is simply its negative aspect.
It is
the power to dissuade another party from doing something
which one believes to be against one's own interests,
achieved by the threat of applying some sanction."'
"Deterrence and Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV
(June 1960), 16 3 .
17
A model, as defined and used by this writer, is:
A structure embodying a set of variables having a specified
set of interrelations, but which variables and relation
ships need have only limited correspondence with the empiri
cal phenomena and relations among the empirical phenomena
to which they refer.
See for example Robert T. Golembiewski,
William A. Welsh, and William J. Crotty, A Methodological
Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Comp an y, 1969), pp. 427-446.
A model is a theoretical

Deterrence theories of several writers

1$

will be scruti

nized, and the components of their strategies will be
constructed into a representative model of deterrence
strategy.

By constructing a deterrence model, it will be

possible to evaluate Ataerican deterrence strategy and,
more specifically, determine why it failed.

Such an

examination may help explain Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba.
This thesis wjjll analyze and evaluate American
deterrence strategy through the application of the deter
rence model to determine whether it can serve as an
explanation as to whgt led Khrushchev to believe that he
could successfully deploy missiles in Cuba.
Q t

is the position of this thesis, and it will be

demonstrated through the analysis adopted, that a possible
answer to what led Khrushchev to believe that he could
successfully place missiles in Cuba can be found in the
examination of the following hypothesis:
Certain ftufa.jective factors of American foreign
policy toward the Soviet bloc convinced the
„

-----------

construct of isomorphic design that describes, explains,
and predicts Reality, and is a low-level theory by defini
tion.
1$
The most notable among these so-called ’’war
thinkers" aref Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, David
Singer, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Albert Wohlstetter,
Morton Halpe/in, George Lowe, Fred Green, and Glenn Snyder.
It should be noted that this author has borrowed quite
liberally from the work of Glenn S n y d e r . (See supr a,
p.

7,

n.

1

)

9
Russians and Khrushchev that the U . S . would not
respond with military force to the creation of
an offensive Soviet missile base in Cuba.
Simply stated, the hypothesis is a repudiation
of the ability of American deterrence strategy to deter
aggressive acts by a potential enemy .(i.e. , the Soviet
Unio n) „

Implicitly, the hypothesis states that certain

behavior patterns of U.S, leaders in conducting foreign
policy indicated to the Russians? irresolution, inaction,
unwillingness to use force, vacillation, undefined poli
cies and goals, willingness to negotiate, discrepancies
between words and deeds, and an obsession with pursuing
peace.

The fact that the U.S. had just elected the

youngest man in its history to fill the most powerful seat
of government in the world--the presidency of the United
States— also brought doubt on the U,S,'s determination and
resolution to meet its commitments.)
The preceding subjective factors (i.e., irresolu
tion, inaction, and vacillation) are perceptions held by
an individual which are of a psychological dimension.
These perceptions are normally involved in the calculation
of what is known in the deterrence language as mcredibility,”

Snyder defines credibility as,

, . , the perception by the threatened party [in
this thesis the Soviet Union] of the degree of
probability that the power-wielder [in this thesis
the U.S.] will actually carry out the threat if

10
its terms are not complied with or will keep a
promise if its conditions are m e t ,19
.To demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis
statement, five international crises have been chosen
which can be analyzed through the deterrence model to
determine whether the subjective factors were present.
These five crises can be considered as limited probes of
American resolve:

Russian-Cuban relations, the Bay of

Pigs, Laos, Vienna, and the Berlin Wall,

If it can be

shown that the subjective factors were present in each
one of these crises, then we can logically conclude that
what led Khrushchev to believe he could succeed in de
ploying missiles in Cuba was in fact a "failure of deter
rence" and the expectation that the U,S, would not act.

Method and Sources Used in Study
Such an analysis, as using the deterrence model,
also includes the description of the "role"

20

of the

% n y d e r , o£, ci t, , p, 164,
Throughout the re
mainder of this paper, reference to deterrer will mean
the U , S , , and reference to the aggressor will mean the
Soviet U n i o n ,

20

Role is defined as "the behavior expected of a
leader, the predictable behavior which others adjust and
respond to, the acts and functions of each leader that
together create the structure of international society,"
See Burton, 0£, c i t ,, p„ 103, lor a more detailed discus
sion of role and role systems, see Heinz Eulau, The
Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random
H o u s e , 1963), especially pp, 13-79,

11
Chief Executive in foreign affairs and the role of the
Premier in Soviet foreign policy„ /The problem of estab
lishing, with a relatively high degree of accuracy,
foreign policy objectives for the U»S„ and the Soviet
Union is a basic requirement to this study,,

The method

chosen for this investigation utilizes the concept of
"elite articulation,,"^

This concept is based on a single

presumptions "foreign policy"

22

objectives are what the

foreign policy elite say they are „

)

Stated generally, decision-making elite consist of
those individuals who perform the function of politi
cal authorization in the foreign policy are na „ Poli
tical authorization may be defined as authorization
sanctioned by the conventions of the system 023
( The foreign policy elite is normally composed of the head
of government, his executive secretaries, and his foreign
2lFor a discussion of "elite articulation" in
foreign policy analysis, see Stanley Hoffman, Contemporary
Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N » J 0;
Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp„ 171-75ff®
po
^ I n this discussion "foreign policy"' means the
courses of action and the decisions relating to them that
a state undertakes in its relations with other states in
order to attain national objectives and to advance the
national interest„ See Charles Lerche, Foreign Policy of
the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N„Jo?
PrenticeH a l l , 1962), pp„ 4 - 5 f f ; also John G„ Stoessinger, The
Might of Nations (New York? Random House, 1962)!,
pp,, 211-29®
Stoessinger simplifies Lerc he 1s definition
by saying, "A nation’s foreign policy is the expression
of its national interest vis-a-vis other nations" (p, 27)®
^ P e t e r M 0 Meloy, "Soviet-American Military
Strategy? What Price Security?" (unpublished M a s t e r ’s
thesis, University of Montana, 1969), P® 9®

12

minister*

In the U.S., the President is delegated the

powers by the Constitution to conduct foreign affairs and
represent the U.S'.

The office of the President, the

Secretaries of Defense and State are the American elite
structure.for defining the national interests,

i

and policies.

objectives,

In the Soviet Union, the top foreign

policy-making elite are members of the powerful party
organization known as the Politburo
“Jhe foreign policy of every nation-state is at all
times presumably designed to promote the ’’national
interest.”

The national interest is what the n a t i o n ’s

leaders say it is.J^

Interests are inescapably involved

with security and well being; objectives are the specific
applications of interests to meet particular international
situations; and policies are means designed to attain
2^For a definitive discussion of Soviet party
organization, foreign policy formulation, and organiza
tion of government, see J. F. Triska and D. D. Finely,
Soviet Foreign Policy (New York?
MacMillan and C o . ,
1968) 7

“

"

^ F o r another conception of the ’’national interest,”
see Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest
(New York:
Random H o u s e , 1951). Morgenthau advocates
that American foreign policy -should follow ’’one guiding
light— the national interest.” - Morgenthau is thinking
strictly of ’’national interest” defined in terms of power.
In his Politics Among Nations (4th ed,; New York:
Knopf,
1967), Morgenthau stated his much-quoted theory of inter
national politics”
. . international politics is the
concept of interest defined in terms of power. . . . W e
assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest
defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that
assumption out . . .” (p. 5 )*

13
objectives*

>It will be an assumption of this thesis that

the national interests and core interests of a particular
nation-state (e,g„ the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) are in
specific cases the statements and actions of the national
leaders*

But it remains useful or even essential that

policy-makers act as if there were such a thing as the
national interest and endeavor to promote i t y

It is

often apparent, because of bad policy, that policy-makers
have not so acted.

The failure of deterrence to dissuade

Khrushchev from putting missiles in Cuba is a good case in
point.

f'-’
The conceptualization of the deterrence model will
serve as a theoretical construct to analyze deterrence
strategy in the five international crises mentioned
earlier (see s u p r a , p. 10)i

This discussion will be

developed in Chapter I
Chapter II is a discussion of President Kennedy's
policy statements concerning national interests, objectives,
and foreign policies.

This chapter will examine deter

rence strategy as applicable to Cuba, the Soviet Union,
Western Europe, Laos, and Berlin.
Chapter III, which comprises a large portion of
this thesis, will involve the application of the deter
rence model to the five international crises.

It will

become apparent through this analysis that the ,,Tsubjective

14
factors” influencing Soviet behavior were present in
these events0

Each case was a clear example of the

weakening of deterrence strategy,,

Stated policy interests

and objectives were not backed by force* decisive firmness,
or action,,

American threats and verbal statements of

policy were not credible because they were not buttressed
by force and acti o n„ r,A threat that is not credible is
pA
no deterrent."
As Hans Morgenthau has so aptly stated:
nIn

the nuclear age, the very purpose of threat and

counterthreat is to prevent the test of actual performance
27
from taking place.'"

The Cuban missile crisis was indeed

a reality, a crisis of such tenuous brinkmanship that one
wonders if Herman K a h n ’s odd locution that nuclear war is
"unthinkable” may very well have been the case of ’"thinking
o$
the unthinkableo” ;
”In our times," writes Kahn, "thermo-

y

nuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous,
26

Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 113~
2?Hans
New L e a de r , ILYI

Morgenthau, "Significance in History,"
(December 19 63), 6.

^ H e r m a n K a h n ’s known detachment and cold calcu
lations concerning the possibilities of nuclear war may
be rather insensitive to human suffering, but his rational
izations of the effects of war are strikingly clear to a
point of disbelief.
Similar thoughts are also expressed
in Ka h n ’s other two significant contributions:
On Thermo
nuclear War (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University
Press, i960 )’ and On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios
(New York:
Praeger^ 1965)»
~
~

15
or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible.” 29

These

are indeed very sobering words.
•Chapter IV is a discussion of Premier Khrushchev:
his attitudes, his behavior, and his politics.

This

chapter will develop the proposition that Khrushchev,
given his propensity towards opportunism, coupled with
rational calculations, was not a ’’reckless, adventuresome,
and highly irrational”? leader,

as described by some

scholars X
(This thesis will not discuss the political and
military objectives behind placing missiles in Cuba.
These objectives have been described by several authors
and this writer finds their calculations accurate.
(Chapter V is a discussion of Soviet pre-crisis
calculations.
question:

This chapter will attempt to answer the

What led Khrushchev to believe that he could

successfully deploy missiles in Cuba?

The hypothesis

statement will be tested in this chapter to determine
whether it can serve as an explanation of Soviet behavior.
Risk-taking of Soviet leaders will be examined and
^ H e r m a n Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable
Horizon Press, 1962), p. 19®

(New York:

3^See for example Arnold L, Horelick, The Cuban
Missile Crisis (S'anta Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation,
Mem. RM-3779-PR, September 1963), pp® 4-21; and Nathan
Leites, Kremlin Thoughts:
Yielding, Rebuffing, P rovoking,
Retreating (Santa Monica, Calif:
Rand Corporation, Mem.
RM-361 3-tISA, May 19 6 3 ) , pp. 1-24; and also Crane, _op, c i t . ,
pp. 523-563°
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interrelated to Soviet decision-making#
Soviet leaders'

And finally, the

expectations regarding U.S # response will

'~s.v

be evaluated^#
At this point a possible critic may question
whether Soviet motives and behavior can be accurately
interpreted and described#

This writer agrees to some

extent with the remarks of one Soviet scholar, Alexander
Dallin,

concerning Soviet behavior, when he saids

To weigh the continuing changes in the Soviet situ
a t i o n - r e a l and apparent, deliberate and unintended,
lasting and transient— the observer must reach
judgments based on uncertain data and frequently
contradictory impressions#31
Unless Khrushchev and his colleagues choose to reveal the
considerations and calculations that actually guided their
decisions and actions in the crisis, as opposed to the
superficial propagandized version of them as "saving the
peace" that was announced by the Soviet Premier and his
cohorts, the questions I have set out to answer will
necessarily not be susceptible to definitive resolution.
Fidel Castro reportedly told a friendly French correspon
dent that Khrushchev's motives were unknown to him and
were a complete mystery#

They may not be known by

his

torians "in 20 or 30 years#"3^} Yet if we are to derive any

3lAlexander Dallin, et a l . , The Soviet Union and
Disarmament (New Yorkr
Praeger, 1964), pp. 3-4#
32Conversation with Claude Julien, Le Monde,
March 22, 1963#

17
useful foreign policy and defense lessons from the Cuban
missile crisis, we cannot wait for history.
As earlier stated, I discovered through my
initial research on this thesis many questions totally
unresolved and inadequately answered.

The treatment of

President Kenne dy 1s behavior and role as a determinant
leading to the crisis has not been examined.

This thesis

is as much a repudiation of the effectiveness of American
deterrence strategy as it is an incriminating indictment
of President Kennedy’s failure to exhibit leadership in
the White House.

An Richard Neustadt has cogently writtens

He [the President] makes his personal power impact;
by the things he says and does.
Accordingly, his
choices of what he should say and do, and how and
when, are his means to conserve and tap his sources
of power.
Alternatively, choices are the means by
which he dissipates his power.
The outcome, case
by case, will often turn on whether he perceives his
task in power terms and takes account of what he
sees before he makes his choice.33
,'The performance of the Kennedy Administration in foreign
'affairs is of dubious quality.

President Kennedy’s

famous statement, " L e t ’s get moving again,” surely could
not apply to foreign policy.

The record is replete with for

eign! policy. failures;: the Bay of!:Pigk,oLaos-^f>Lenna^ -Cuba
policy, and the Berlin Wall.

And the greatest one of them

all was the Cuban missile crisisT")
-^Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Bower:
The
Politics of Leadership (New Yorks
John Wiley and Sons,
I n c ., 1960), p. 179o

id
Searching for the answers to the questions I have
posed can be of great value, particularly when they are
tested against Soviet behavior in the coming months and
yearsFinally, a word should be said about the validity
of my research desi gn „

It does not purport to answer all

the questions concerning the Cuban

missile crisis-

criteria used in evaluating models

generally agreed upon

by theoreticians are:
(3) generality,

(1), validity,

(4) measurement of

(5) significance, and (6)' internal

The

(2); flexibility,

sophistication,
logic,-^

The deterrence model on which this thesis bases
much of its conclusions is a general, low-level theoryIt is the belief of this writer that the deterrence model
meets the requirements of being descriptive, explanatory,
and predictive-

A model is a central tool of political

science and "fundamentally, all explanation proceeds in
terms of models-"-^
The conclusion will include some general remarks
the author has formed in light of the research done on
this topic-

These remarks might be collectively entitled

-^Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty, o p - cit-,
pp- 430-31ff» Definitions of terms are given on these
pages and the following,
^ I v a n D- London, "The Role of Model in Explana
tion," Journal of Genetic Psychology, LXXIV (June 1949),
165, as quoted in Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty,
op — cit o , p o 42*7 o
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T,A Reaffirmation of Decisive Action in Achieving Foreign
Policy Goals*"

The conclusions of this thesis may be

able to provide answers to the following questions?
1o

How should a President administer foreign

policy to best protect and guard his personal power?
2.

How can a President make policy choices that

build rather than dissipate his influence and power?
When attempting to conduct a study of this nature,
it becomes somewhat of a problem to identify those written
materials which most honestly reflect the assumptions,
intentions, attitudes, and policies of national leaders
("elite")*

This researcher has found the following sources

most useful?

Public Papers of the President, the Depart

ment of State Bulletin, the Department of Defense B u l l e t i n ,
the New York T i m e s , the Wall Street Journal, the Washing
ton P o s t „ Foreign Aff ai rs , the Rand Corporation, Committee
Reports and Hearings; and the biographies of John F*
Kennedy*
For sources of Soviet statements concerning
policy, The Current Digfest of the Soviet Press was used,,
Included are English translations of Prav da , Kommunist„ >
and Izvestia*

PART I

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

1961-1962

CHAPTER I

AMERICAN DETERRENCE STRATEGY 1961-1962

"Deterrence through military power/" according to
Arnold Wolfers, "is as old as the multistate system it1

-

self: si vis pacem para helium was a classic commentary/ ’
tWith the advent of nuclear weapons after World War II,
deterrence assumed a much more commanding role in defense
policies, security objectives, and the attainment of
national i n t e r e s t s I f self-preservation is the first
■■■"-

'y

law of nature, it is also the first law of foreign
2
policyo
Deterrence is a means for providing for the
security and well-being of a nation’s national interests
and its citizens,,

( In its most fundamental sense deterrence is
” o o o the discouragement of military aggression by the
threat (implicit or explicit) of applying military force
1

2

Wolfers, ojOo cit „, p 0 139«

Co Vo Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the
Nuclear Age (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965), p. 1ff«
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in response to the a g g r e s s i o n D e t e r r e n c e ,

similar to

all forms of power, functions in an inducing capacity to
dissuade individuals from doing things that they would
not otherwise do or refrain from d o i n g v ^ W e speak of individuals in this case for the simple reason that the inter
national system is composed of ”actors” and "nations”
interrelating and interacting with each other.

Walter

Clemens, Jr. has described it in the following manner;
The international political system is a product of
both voluntarism and determinism.
It is an arti
fice that men make; and it is an organism that grows
in unforeseen ways as a result of the forces im
pacting upon it A
(Because states are abstractions, or at best conglomerates
of personalities, it is not the nation or state that makes
the political or military decisions and acts but always
individuals (though they be politicians or statesmen),..
Bince decisions are translated into strategies^ by indi
viduals, '"human elements are the real keys to the making
% n y d e r , _0£. c i t ., p. 167« This definition is a
simplified definition of deterrence given in the Intro
duction of this paper (see supra, p. 7, n. 16). This
simplified definition will be the meaning of the term in
the remainder of this paper.
^Clemens,

ojd .

cit. , p. 3»

^Strategy is here defined as:
"The art of apply
ing force so that it makes the most effective contribu
tion towards achieving the ends set by political policy.”
In Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (New York:
Praeger, 1965), p. 22.
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and execution of strategy*"

6

Leaders, statesmen, and

politicians make decisions, not states*

Governments are

made up of persons and w e h a v e , through the use of more
sophisticated research methods, learned a great deal
7
about the behavior of persons*
This point need not be
labored; in the final analysis?

"It is a truism that all

action within the international system can be reduced to
the action of individuals

§

The international system is

a dynamic system, not a static one*

It involves the

transmission and communication of nations’ policies, atti
tudes, and intentions*

(Through the medium of "elite

articulation," a nation’s stated objectives and national
interests are expressed)

It is through the manipulation

of political power as well as military power that such
interests are achieved*

To this end, deterrence is the

means through which they may be secured*
Although the aim of deterrence strategy can

^Arleigh Burke, Risk of General Nuclear W a r ,
cited in David M* Abshire and Richard V* Allen, National
Security (New York:
Praeger, 1963), "Introduction*"
?This point is emphasized by Bernard Brodie, On
Escalation, o p * cit * , see pp„ 130-140,
°Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verda, The International
System (Princeton, N*J*?
Princeton University Press,
1962)*
This particular quotation was taken from a
theoretical essay written by Yerda, entitled "Assumptions
of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the
International System," p* 73°
His particular political
theories incorporate the concept of "elite articulation,"
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hardly be misinterpreted, nTo deter direct nuclear attack
Q

on the United States » „ » ,"

the deterrent system also

must be able to ". „ , deter any kind of aggression,
10
whether military or n o n - m i l i t a r y D e t e r r e n c e

strategy

must not only be functional.at the level of deterring a
major nuclear war, but it also must provide for the un
foreseen, for technological or enemy-inspired surprises,
for various options to insure that strategy can serve
policy, and for a margin of error or miscalculation on
both sides0 ^The outcome desired in implementing deter
rence strategy can be described as follows?
o o 0 to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish
to impose on him„
In this dialectic of wills a
decision is achieved when a certain psychological
effect has been produced on the enemy; when he be
comes convinced that it is useless to_start or
alternatively to continue the struggle.^ 1
As one author has stated?
"Deterrence i_s the real world,
1p f
not a game.,"
( A bipolar world loses the perspective for
^Henry Rowen, "The Basic Issues of National
Strategy," Western Political Science Quart er ly , XIII
(September i960 ), Supplement, 42.
1n
Thomas S» Power, Design for Survival (New York?
Coward-McCann, 1965), p« 1&5«
'
^Beaufre,

0£° cit., p„ 23.

^ A r t h u r Waskow, The Limits of Defense (Garden
City, NoYof Doubleday, 1965), p. 12.
In W a s k o w ’s refer
ence to "game," he is referring to the mathematical games
Thomas Schelling plays in his"Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, Mass.?
Harvard University Press, 1963).
There
are two main types:
(1) "non-zero-^um game" and (2) "zerosum game,," The "zero-sum"' game is considered by strate
gists as the "pure form of 'conflict
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nuance: a gain for one side takes the form as an absolute
3

loss for the other!

The international system is like a

"delicate balance of t e r r o r " ^

in whieh a serious miscal

culation by either super power may lead to the mutual
destruction of bothu^
■ l
r~
■.'
(^The capacity to deter is a function of several
factors:

(1) military capabilities,

paredness,

(2) military pre

(3) credibility of threats, and (4) the total

cost-gain expectations of the party to be deterred„

The

summation of such factors may be called "political power»"
Described in another fashion, Robert Dahl has written
that power consists of four basic components: base, means,
amount, and scope0

These four components are ultimately

transformed through the use of deterrence strategy into
national power,,

National power is "1

„ » the ability to

influence the behavior of another nation in accordance
with the goals of on e!s own action*,"^
Dahl

15

states that the power base is the material

or attribute (capability) that provides the capacity to
affect the value positions of others, e og 0 , military force

^■%ee Albert.Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of
Terror," World Politics, XXXVII (January 1959)» 21 1 f f 0
^ D e a n G a Pruitt, "National Power and Inter
national Responsiveness," in Sondermann and Olson, o p 0
cito, p 0 293o
^ R o b e r t A., Dahl, "The- Concept of Power,"
Behavioral Science, II (1957), 201-16 o
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and economic a ss e t s .

The mea ns , according to Dahl, is

the method by which the power base is brought to bears
for examples by threats ultimatums or force demonstration.
The amount of power is the degree of influence over poten
tial actionso

The scope is the range of potential actions

by the other party which can be influenced by the threat
or promise of applying the base.,

To translate this into

the terms of deterrence, the following would apply; the
base in graduated deterrence is the capacity to inflict
unacceptable punishment on the enemy; the means is the
threat of retaliation; the scope refers to the various
forms of aggression, the probability of which may be re 
duced by the threat; and the amount is the reduction in
probability of each of these moves which results from the
threat., ^^
f’ Aside from the four components just mentioned,
two other factors need to be mentioned; the object values
and the credibility of a threat or promise.
values are the values of the other party.

Object
They are typi

cally his total cost-gain expectations in pursuing a
certain act and they are subject to being decreased or
increased by the actual carrying out of the threat or
promise'h)

The sixth component,

c r e d i b i l i t y , ^ is the least

1

' For a definitive discussion of these categories,
see Snyder, op>, cit , , p. l63ff°
1?For an operational definition of credibility,
see s u p r a , p,
9«
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tangible and most crucial element in the strategy of deter
rence,,

"Credibilitys" states David Singer, is ”T0 „ ■> making

the potential attacker believe that the threat will be
1 & /'^
carried out„”
(Interpreting what the author has so far

s-*
said, it can be seen that the political power and the
foundation of deterrence reside in two distinct elements^
capabilities

(i«e„, the capacity to affect the object

values of the aggressor by application of a power base) and
the deterrer’s intent to use these capabilities if one's
demands are not metf!^
j

Political power is the ability to

persuade or influence which results from threat or promise
to inflict deprivations to object values; physical power
is the ability to affect object value s„

Physical power,

which in a state is transformed into military power, is
" o o o ultimately the power to destroy and kill, or to
occupy and control, and hence to c o e r c e , " ^ CDeterrence is
a form of power relation--the power to dissuade„

Deter

rence is the discouragement of military aggression by
threat of applying military force in response to aggression<j)PAhd as Henry Kissinger has said?

armament
po 57o

"There can be no

^ D a v i d Sanger, Deterrence, Arms Control, and D i s 
(Columbus, Ohio!
State University Press, 1962),

^Snyder,

o£„ c i t «,, p„ 165®

^ K l a u s Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in
the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N „ J 0r Princeton University
Press, 1966), chap„ ii„
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gap in deterrence.
is not

Deterrence is either effective or it

/

The Logic of Deterrence
Deterrence, like all political phenomena, is not
likely to operate as a strict law or principle,.

However,

it does have a consistent and logical foundation,,
^The

object of military deterrence as stated is to

T,deter a g g r e s s i o n w h e t h e r it is of the military or no n
military typdy

This involves reducing the probability of

enemy military (aggressor) moves inimical to o n e ’s sel f0

r"

/Snyder states that the probability of any particular
attack by the aggressor is the result of four factors
which exist in his mind.

All four taken together are the

aggressor’s risk calculus„

Snyder defines them in the

following manner:
(1) The aggressor’s valuation of an objective;
(2) The cost which he expects to suffer in an attack
on the objective, as the result of various pos
sible responses by the deterrer;
(3) The probability of various responses, including
no response;
(4) The probability of winning the objective with
each possible response„22
These are the basic factors the aggressor must assess in
determining whether an action is likely to result in a net
gain or a net co s t V

The ’’risk calculus” is in part a

p1
Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice
(New York:
Harper Bros., 19o1)> p„ 12.
■
22see Snyder,

ojd. ci t . , p„ 167«
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psychological matter,

,TIt rests principally upon an

enemy’s judgment of the likelihood of various possible
outcomes of an attacko

<> <> ,” ^3

The third factor in the

aggressor’s ’’risk calculus” represents the credibility of
various possible responses by the actions of the deterrer<>
The deterrent effectiveness of a possible or threatened
response is a function of all four factors.
The Concept of Credibility
( The ’’credibility factor” in deterrence strategy
has an essential function inasmuch as it is through the
aggressor’s calculation of the deterrer’s ’’credibility” and
’’perceived intentions” that he bases his decisions to act~^
A restatement of this concept may be useful at this time:
23
^Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable, o p , c i t , , p, 111,
Kahn presents a penetrating discussion of deterrence
strategy and states that U,S, military policy seeks to .
achieve at least six broad strategic objectives;
(1) Type I Deterrenee--to deter a large attack on the mili
tary f o rc es , population, or the wealth of the U,S,;
(2) Type II Deterrence— to deter extremely provocative
actions short of war on the U.S.; (3) Improved War Outcome-to limit damage to the U,S, and to improve the military
outcome for the U,S>,; (4) Stability--to reduce the likeli
hood of an inadvertent thermonuclear war; (5) Comprehensive
Arms ControI--to control and limit both arms race and the
use of force in settling disputes; (6) Type III Deterrence-to deter provocations not covered by Type II Deterrence,
such as Controlled Reprisal, other limited wars, mobili
zations, negotiations, and so forth.
This author cannot
disagree with these objectives.
These were valid military
objectives actively pursued by our national government in
the early 1960?s ,
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(Credibility is defined as the perception by the
threatened party [aggressor] of the degree of
probability that the power-wielder [deterrer]
will actually carry out the threat if its terms
are not complied with or will keep a promise if its
conditions are met).
(See s u p r a , p.
9.)
"The paradoxical consequences,” when the aggressor
attempts to calculate his risk calculus, "istthat the
success of military policy depends on essentially psycho
logical c r i t e r i a . " ^

The aggressor’s "risk calculus" is

determined by estimating the expected costs involved in
pursuing a certain objective should that objective not be
obtained, and also the expected net gains are calculated.
CThe potential aggressor is presumably deterred from a
military move not simply when his expected cost exceeds
his expected gain but when the net gain is less or the net
cost is more than he expects when he refrains from the
25
move.
Expectations are based on the calculations of the
deterrer1s image system, attitudes,
bility facto^o

intentions, and credi

The images created by the credibility

factor are crucial. ^"Images guide human behavior.

. . .

Most decisions are made on the basis of facts as seen by
^ K i s s i n g e r , ojd . c i t . , p. 12. For a sociopsychological approach to international policies, see
David Singer, Human Behavior and International Politics
(Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965); also Joseph de Rivera,
The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus,
O h i o : C» E. Merrill Publishing C o . , 196$).
25snyder, o p . c it., p„

1660
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the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ( I t a l i c s

mine,)

Since deterrence

strategy must appear credible, the deterrer must somehow
communicate to the aggressor that he really would strike
if his vital national or core interests were endangere'di)
The power base of nuclear deterrence which provides the
capacity to affect the value positions

(expectations)

of

the aggressor is the arsenal of weapons available to the
deterrer0 (As Hans Morgenthau has indicated, nuclear force
has a "psychological function pure and simple'^

He

further states that,
o o .("the prospective opponents are kept constantly
awa re "of the inevitability of their own destruction
should they resort to nuclear force, and this aware
ness prevents them from resorting to it„ „ „ „ In
the nuclear age, the very purpose of threat and
counterthreat is to prevent the test of actual per
formance from taking place0 The appearance of pos
sessing both the ability and the resolution, to make
good the threat and counterthreat becomes, then, of
paramount importance as a condition for the success
of mutual deterrence„ „ „ <> The nature of this con
dition, it will be rioted, is political rather than
military for what is essential is the appearance,
not the reality, of possessing the ability and reso
lution to make good threat and eounterthreat„27
(Italics mine o)
r\

/T

Stagner, a p c cit „ , pp. 55-69ff<> For matters of
clarification a decision is defined as n‘» » . any act,
symbolic or overt, whi ch is socially defined as a commit
ment to carry out a specified task, to take the responsi
bilities of a specified social role, or to execute a
specified course of action in the future,," See Irving L,
Janis, "Decisional Conflicts?
A Theoretical Analysis,"
Journal of Conflict R esolution, III (March 19 5 9 ) y 6»
27
'Hans Jo Morgenthau, "The Four Paradoxes of
Nuclear Strategy," American Political Science Review,
LVIII (March 1964), 24.
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.In
the mechanics of mutual deterrence an element of bluff
v,
either real or supposed is required.

Deterrence works

only because there remains in the minds of both sides a
doubt as to whether the other side is really bluffing.
This creates a condition of mutual deterrence which is
. the ability— mutually recognized--of each side to
destroy the other, no matter who strikes first
\Deterrence strategy is clearly based on a belief
s y s t e m ^ involving such criteria as the followings
interpretations of images, psychological dispositions of
both parties, perceived intentions, and credibility fac
tors,

Since decision-makers act upon their definition of

the situation and their images, it is imperative that
threats and counterthreats be implemented in such a way
as to reinforce positively the aggressor’s expectation of
net loss rather than anticipated net gai'n^,

The deterrer’s

credibility factor must impress upon the aggressor through
the perceptual mechanism of threats and counterthreats
that certain objectives are valued highly by the deterrer.
(^’The problem of deterrence thus becomes the problem of
^ R a y m o n d L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy; A
Historical Analysis (New York:
Praeger, 1966;, p, 111,
^ F o r an illustrative analysis of national "belief
systems," see Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and
National Images," Journal of Gonflict Resolution, VI,
No, 5 (1962), 244-245ff- Holsti notes that a belief
system "orients the individual to his environment, de
fining it for him its salient characteristics" (p. 245)«.
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credibility.”
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The purpose of a threat is to prevent

an undesired action (i0e„, military or non-military
aggression) without actually engaging the aggressor in
conflict®

"A threat will be credible if there is reason

to believe that the one who makes the threat is both
^
31
able and willing to carry it ou§<>”
(Italics mine.)
Thomas Schelling has stated the matter quite definitively
when he said?
We have learned that a threat has to be credible to
be efficacious and that its credibility may depend
on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment
for the party making the threat0 We have developed
the idea of making a threat credible by getting our
selves committed to its fulfillment, through the
stretching of a ’’trip wiren across the enem y’s paths
of advance or by making fulfillment a matter of
national honor and prestige0 ® ® .32
Schelling further states that a threat must be backed by
action not words, both the threat and the commitment have
to be communicatedo
threat itself.

If not, he (deterrer) may deter the

Schelling goes on to say;

Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself,
if they are visible to the threatened party, weaken
the visible commitment and hence reduce the credi
bility of the threato
O

O

O

O

O

O
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^ Clinton F. Fink, ’’More Calculations about Deter
rence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965),
54®
Philip Green, in Deadly Logic;
The Theory of Nuclear
Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio;
Ohio State University Press,
1966), presents a somewhat similar line of argument.
31

J Fink, op. cit o, p„ 54®
^S c h e l l i n g , ojd. ci t ., p. 6.
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It is essential, therefore, for maximum credibility,
to leave as little room as possible for judgment or
discretion in carrying out the thre a t,
The threat must invoke overt acts rather than
intentions; it must be attached to the visible deeds
not invisible ones* 0 . »
O

O

O

O

0

O

O

O

O

O

O
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o
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o

And finally, the act of punishment must be one
whose effect or influence is clearly a discernible
one,33
A summary remark concerning the above might be helpful?
(Deterrence requires a combination of p ow e r , the will
to use it, and the assessment of these by the poten
tial aggressor.
Moreover, deterrence is a product
of those factors and not a sum.
If any one of them
is zero, deterrence fails.
Strength, no matter how
overwhelming, is useless without the willingness, to
resort to if)34
(Italics mine,)
("Schelling states that the deterrer must threaten
‘'■X,
that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat
failsx.

To say that one may act is to say that one may

A——/

not, and to say this is to confess that one has kept the
power of decision— that one is not committed,35

jn order

for threats to be credible and for the deterrer to be
able to pledge his reputation behind a threat, there must
be continuity between the present and subsequent issues
that will arise,

(The deterrer must exhibit a uniformity
\
and continuity in expressing threats, ))
It must be remembered that "deterrence fails when

33ib i d ,, pp, 40-41*
34Kissinger, op, c i t ,, p, 12,
35s-ee Schelling, op, ci t ,, p, 1&7,
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the attacker decides that the defender®s threat is not
likely to be f u l f i l l e d . " ^

A successful threat is one

not implemented.
(lit is somewhat of a paradox that deterrence
strategy's logical core is based so much on psychologi
cal factors.

A good example is the matter of a threat

which is meant as a bluff.

If taken seriously by the

aggressor the bluff is more useful than a serious threat
37
which is interpreted as a b l u f f.

When bluffs are tested

and found wanting, rTthe nuclear threat will lose a measure
of its plausibility," and in consequence "it will lose a
measure of its restraining effe ct p’^
At this point a word should be said about the

r~

element of "rationality.” v^To act "rationally" means
simply to choose from among the available courses of action
(i.e., objectives in "risk calculus"), the one which
t

promises to maximize expected values (or minimize expected
IQ
cost) over the long run. i "A rational individual or
3^Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII (June 19&7)> 98®
Urs Schwarz, American Strategy;
A New Per
spective (New York; Doubleday, 1966), entire "Introduction."
-^Morgenthau, Four Paradoxes, o p . c i t . , p. 24®
3 9ihe most usual concept of rationality is that it
is a process of means-ends analysis.
The simplest case of
means-ends analysis involves a single goal sought by the
decision-maker.
Rational choice is the selection among
alternatives of the action that maximizes the goal.
See
Sidney Verba in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, The
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soci e ty /’ says Thomas Milburn, ’’will n o t , for example, seek
loss but only some kind of win.”^

An example will suffice

to explicate the definition of rational: / A rational indi
vidual will be reluctant to participate in a game of chance
in which he may lose his entire capital, even if his mathe
matical expectation is one of substantial gain.

The deter

rence model assumes rationality of both deterrer and
a g g r e s s o r ’’Deterrence is not a game, it is the real

/

world.”

A potential aggressor for example will not start

or attempt a first strike if he knows that such action will
ultimately lead to his own destruction.
are the workings of "taadmen.”

Such calculations

But as Kahn has said:

Our deterrent must be powerful enough to withstand
all of the stresses and strains of the cold war, of
sudden and unexpected crises, of possible accidents
and miscalculations, of satellite revolts, of limited
wars, of fanciful calculations by optimistic gamblers
or simple-minded theoreticians, and of these situ
ations in which ’’reciprocal fear of surprise attack”
might destabilize an inadequate deterrent. . . .
Moreover we want to deter even the mad.
International S y s t e m , article entitled, ’’’
R ationality and
Non-Rationality,” ojd. c i t ., p. 107; and William A. Scott,
"Rationality and Non-Rationality of International Atti
tudes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (1956), 6-10.
^ T h o m a s Milburn, ’’What Constitutes Effective
D et er r e n c e / ’ Journal of Conflict Resol ut io n, III, No. 2
(June 1959), 140; and Philip Green, op>. c i t . , pp. 1$6-160.
^ K a h n , Thinking the Unthinkable, o p . cit.,
p. 111.
K a h n ’s remarks concerning deterring the ”mad”
may not be comprehensible to the layman, but Kahn is sin
cere.
Perhaps the ’’living would envy the dead" as Kahn
remorselessly states.
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("I'n summary, for deterrent effectiveness, according'
\,
'
V/
to S’n yd e r , the deterrer must make sure that his military
posture and threats pose greater costs than gains for the
aggressor and to make sure that his threat is believed.
The deterrer must estimate how much evidence supporting
the threatened intent would be necessary to achieve credi
bility,, \
Qthetorie is no substitute for action in foreign
affairso

Power and influence are the means of facili

tating deterrence), and ” , . . they share the role of being

IQ
the means par excellence of foreign p o l i c y Power and
influence are inextricably interrelated to will and
determination.
preservation ,

The first law of foreign policy is selfThe two basic goals of foreign policy are?

(1) to enhance the s e c u r i t y ^ 0f the nation and (2)' to
provide for the w e l l - b e i n g ^ of its citizenry.

To these

ends, deterrence strategy must address itself,

^ W o l f e r s , _og, cit ,, p, 104.
^ S e c u r i t y is here defined as physical safety,
territorial integrity, and political independence.
^♦Well-being requires the preservation of cultures
and values of its way of life.

3$
The Requirements of Effective
Executive Leadership
(.The role of the Chief Executive in foreign affairs
is indisputable— his is the "vital center of action'V^ in
the formulation,
policy,,

initiation, and implementation of foreign

Throughout history, writes a leading student of

the Constitution,

"the greatest single force in setting

the course of American foreign policy has been the presi
dential i n i t i a t i v e T h e

many roles the President per

forms in the Twentieth Century reveal the enormousness of
his tasks and his duties: he is the chief executive; he is
the chief legislator; he is the chief of foreign policy
and the commander-in-chief and party leader and chief of
state— the states'

unifying symbol,,

Herman Finer, one of

the outstanding scholars of the presidency, has quite

^5John F, Kennedy, a Pulitzer Prize winner for his
Profiles in Coura ge , was the thirty-fifth President of the
United"States {l9bT“ 1963)o
This speech was delivered to
the National Press Club on January 14? 1960, as quoted in
Robert £T, Hirschfield, The Power of the Presidency
(New York:
Atherton Press,— I n c ,, 196$), p„ 131=
This par
ticular quote was paraphrased by Kennedy from a sentence
written by Woodrow Wilson in his chapter on "The President
of the United States" in Constitutional Government in the
United States (New York:
Columbia University Press" 190$)?
pp. 54=$1o This sentence read: "His is the vital place
of action in the system,"
See also Hirschfield, o£„ c i t »,
Po 95°
^ E d w a r d SO Corwin as quoted in GO V„ C r a b b ,
o p , cito , p 0 43.
The original quotation may be found in
Edward S', Corwin and Louis W, Koenig, The Presidency
Today (New York: New York University P r e s s , 1956);,
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realistically described not only the dynamism of the
office but also its overshadowing burdens in the following
remark:
The quality of the government of the American nation
is staked almost entirely on a gamble--the gamble of
the sufficiency of one man's personal qualities of
mind and character and physique, pitted against the
appalling tasks that history has thrust on the Office
of the President of the United States.47
It may indeed be true, as Woodrow Wilson once said:

"The

President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to
ig
be as big a man as he can,"
but as history has revealed
law and conscience must often yield to time and circum
stance o

But the fact remains:

and decide.

"He himself must integrate

He must lead; his decisions define what the

national interest is."

49

As Richard Neustadt sees it, the problem of the
President involves personal power and politics.
dential power is the power to persuade."

50

"fresi-

The Presi

dent's dilemma is power: what it is, how to get it, how
to keep it, and how to use it.

The power to persuade and

influence is inextricably involved in foreign policy, for
47nerman Finer, The Presidency (Chicago:
sity of Chicago Press, 1960), see "Preface."

Univer

4^Woodrow Wilson, "The President’s Role in Ameri
can Government," cited in Hirschfield, o p . c i t ., p. 93°
4 % e Rivera, op. cit. , p. 131.
^Neustadt,

op. ci t., p. 10.
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"All foreign policy depends on the ability to get other
nations to do what one wants them to do or to desist from
doing what one does not want them to do.”’^"* ( The President
is the prime strategist in foreign policy.

He defines

and articulates the national goals, security objectives,
and foreign policy.
plation:

But government is not merely contem™

” It is action, the solution of problems and the

subdual of difficulties.

Conviction and consciousness

propose the direction and suggest the means.”^2

The act

of conducting foreign policy successfully, Walter Lippmann
has contended, ’’’consists in bringing into balance, with a
comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the na ti o n ’s
commitments and the nation’s power.”

The President, in

order to preserve the security of the nation, must act
purposefully in the face of the challenges confronting the
nation.

(Since American policy is so explicitly based on

deterrence strategy, our strategy must pay particular
attention to determining how the aggressor is calculating
his risks'^

Strategy must be able to assess the forces

4.--- /

which move contemporary events and discover the means for
shaping them in the desired direction.

’’A* good strategist,”

according to Robert Ginsburg,

5"!Arnold Wolfers, ’’Vehicles of Political Stability,”
in David M„ Abshire and Robert G. Allen, op. ci t. , p. 272.
52

Finer,

ojd

. cit.,

p. 121.

41
o « o will seek to preserve maximum freedom of
action to cope with the enemy while restricting
the choices available to him.
To achieve this
objective, he should devise a strategy that will
take maximum advantage of national strengths,
minimize the adverse effect of national weaknesses
and restrict the enemy’s ability to do the same.53
(Italics m i n e .)
The international system involving ’’'actors” and
’’nations” is an environment which has accurately been
called the ’’test of wills
Each side tries to probe and estimate the other
si d e’s degree of commitment and fears, . . . Each
sign of caution in the opponents is likely to be
taken as evidence that the opponent wants to avoid
confrontation and fears the consequences^ and this,
of course, could then increase the morale and r e 
solve of the other side.54
j^Xn the realm of world affairs, experience has shown that
the surest w a y to convince the aggressor of U.S. resolve
is not by ’’formal protests, solemn declarations, or
threats of using the bomb but by quick countermeasures
against harassment and infringements.” ^

The mutuality,

reciprocity, and interdependence of the international
system dictates that threats and counterthreats by the
aggressor must be met with firm resistance and commitment
f

| An ironclad commitment to stated policy objectives

53Robert M. Ginsburg, United States Military
Strategy in the Sixties (New York:
Norton, 196$), p . 14«
5^-Kahn, On Escalation, o p . c i t . , p. 248.
55pavid Binder, "Are We Really Standing Firm in
Berlin?” Repo r te r, XXVI (March 1$, 19621, 22.
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establishes a "trip-line” across which the potential
aggressor dares not crossy

Threats of punishment and

deprivation of object values serve to deter the aggressor
from moves inimical to one’s self.

Threats by the enemy

will constitute ”probes for weakness or for lack of concern with a particular objective.”

56

The President’s

behavior, as expressed through his words and demonstrated
by his actions must lend credibility to national strategy;
if rhetoric is a substitute for action, a credibility gap
will result. (The President’s resolve and determination
in acting decisively in the face of unknown risks and
dangers will ultimately determine whether the international
system will experience a degree of stability^

Eor, as

Robert Osgood has notedr
((it follows the mutual restraint of the superpowers
in avoiding war or coming perilously close to the
brink of war depends less on the military balance
than on their estimation of each others’ comparative
resolve to use force in a clash of interests.5^
(italics mine.)
(Resolve on the part of the President is merely his
ability to give credibility to national strategy and
security o b j e c t i v e s ^ Resolve can be demonstrated to the
^ M o r t o n Kaplan, ”The Calculus of Nuclear Deter
rence,” World Politics, XI (October 1956), 55»
57Rc>bert Osgood, o£. ci t. , p. 146. Resolve in
foreign policy decision-making is associated with the
ability of a leader to make up his mind and to come to a
decision. More specifically, it means ”a firmness in
carrying out a decision or a purpose.”
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(^potential aggressor by offering

, . t h e most powerful

and indisputable evidence of complete determination to rethat he may attempt.
Resolve is demonstrated by making decisions which affect
the behavior of the aggressor and make "a believer out of
him."

The President has the responsibility for making

certain decisions, but whether he actually makes these
decisions depends on his decisiveness.

The office gives

him certain powers, and he must assert them.
dent ” , 0 0

cannot expect to ignore initiatives » ,

from the aggressor "„
in kind

The Presi=-

. . with impunity but must respond

Since governments and their leaders "create

events which some other nation’s decision-makers will
interpret in their own way and will react to it in the
context of their own internal a f f a i r s , " ^ (It is imperative
that national leaders impart positive images of strength,
resolution, and willingness to use fore

-3

The President’s

task is to provide leadership based upon understanding the
requirements of correct and effective01 action.

Such

' Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev
(New York:
Praeger, 1965), p. 242,
^ T r i s k a and Finley, o p , c i t ., p, 307.
60de Rivera, oj>, cit,, p. 1&»
61"Correct and effective" action is closely asso
ciated in the strategy of deterrence with the term "win,"
Effective action is action which subdues or resolves a
conflict in your favor— a win,
A win defined in deterrence
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action requires the successful implementation of power and
physical forces

Former President Eisenhower has said

that this country’s prestige and power should never be
committed unless its chief executive was determined to
win,

’’There is no alternative,” he declared„

a naked, brutal thing in this worldo

’’Force is

» . . If you are

going to use it, you have got to be prepared to go all
63
the w a y c” J

The use of physical force serves notice on

the aggressor that,we value highly certain national
Interests and objectives.,

Implementation of force clari

fies the basic goals of policy toward major issues and
areas.

The President cannot afford to be indifferent about

the use of for ce „

The threatened use of military force is

a dissuading mechanism employed to persuade the aggressor
strategy is the ” „ <> . success in prohibiting the opponent
from employing military force against other nations and/or
restricting their political, economic, and social influ
ence o” See Thomas Milburn, ’’What Constitutes Effective
UoS'o Deterrence,” as quoted in John M„ Mackintosh, Strategy
and Tactics of the Soviet Union (New York:
Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1963.)/ P° 181 .
ZLp
D<”Force represents the capacity to compel compli
ance” normally pursued through overt means such as mili
tary power*
Force is a cause that produces a change or
stops action*
See Reinhold Niebuhr, ’’Berlin and Prestige
in Europe,” The New R e p u b l i c , CXLV (September 2£, 1961)),
17; and cf» Robert Osgood, Limited War (Chicago t Univer
sity of Chicago Press, 1957), pp» 11-20„
63statement made by former President Dwight ©<,
Eisenhower concerning the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion
in April 1961, cited in Mario Lazo, Dagger in the He a r t ;
American Policy Failures in Cuba (New Yorkt Funk and
Wagnalls, 1968), p„ 251«
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from taking military action against your vital interests,?)
<lv
J
National leaders and particularly the President
, o „ cannot be indifferent to the impact of war and
military power upon national self-interests; there
fore, they must base national strategy upon a sound
conception of the conditions for using military
power effectively064
As Robert Osgood has further noted, "A capricious, compul
sive, or irresponsible use of military power cannot be
6*5
expedient,” J

Force is indeed a "naked, brutal thing" and

commitments must be honored, fn i e cost involved in not
honoring threats of military deprivation results in a
weakened and unbelievable credibility posture„

If a

"test of wills" occurs, the deterrer must fulfill his
threat obligations by exhibiting to the aggressor the
necessary resolve and force to persuade him to desist from
the aggressive action^

According to Robert Tucker, there

can be no hesitation in fulfilling our commitments to use
for ce ;
Any attempt to set limitations upon the manner
of employing force must not only prove quite
artificial and ineffective in practice, but
might serve to encourage potential aggressions,
What the U,S, does in world affairs testifies
much more positively about its claimed attachment to
^ R o b e r t Osgood, Limited W a r , o p , c i t ,, p. 13»
^ I b i d ,, p 0
6£>Robert
Yale R e v i e w , CLII

Tucker, "Force and Foreign Policy,"
(Spring 195&)? 3&2-S3,
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freedom* or national security objectives, or its concern
for core interests than what its leaders say about such
principles.

The mark of a great nation is determined not

alone by its inherent finiteness or extrinsic capability
but also by the degree of its steadfastness in accepting
the burdens that challenge its very existence.^7
Hans Morgenthau, in writing about the role of the
chief executive in conducting foreign policy, has elabor
ated the distinctive qualities of the statesman's decision
making capacity in the following manner:
It is a commitment to action.
It is a commitment
to a particular action that precludes all other
courses of action.
It is a decision taken in the
face of the unknown and the unknowable.6$
Morgenthau goes on further to discuss the relationship
between words and deeds:
His rhetoric is verbalized action, an explanation of
deeds to come. What still moves us today in the
recorded oratory of a Churchill or a Roosevelt is
not so much the literary quality per se as the
organic connection between the words and the deeds.
0
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The statesman must commit himself to a particular
course of action to the exclusion of all others.
He must cross the Rubicon or refrain from crossing
it, but he cannot have it both ways.
If he goes
forward he takes certain risks, and if he stands
still he takes other risks.
There is no riskless
middle ground.
Nor can he, recoiling before the
67
'Harold K. Jacobson, America's foreign Policy
(New York:
Random House, 19o5), pp. 99-102ff.
6 % a n s J. Morgenthau, "The Trouble with Kennedy,"
Commentary. XXXIII (January 1962), 5 1 o
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risks of one course of action, retrace his steps
and try some other tack, promising risks different
and fewer*
He has crossed the Rubicon and cannot
undo that crossing.^9
vpnce a national leader makes a commitment to
action through verbalized statements of policy, the imple
mentation of such policy, if it is to be credible, must
demonstrate its uniformity and continuity through time.
*\

There can be no middle course.
The sources of power which are directly derived
from military capabilities are contingent upon the quality
and the image which presidential leadership projects in

r~

the world. \The President protects his power and personal
influence by making decisions that build up and strengthen
his image and prestiggT)

"To make decisions with insight,

the political leader must have learned to know himself
and to master his i d e n t i t y . " ^

Presidential decision

making requires conviction, will, vision, and commitment.
As Charles Marshall states:
Will is the faculty for making choices.
The dif
ference between a weak and a determined will is
simply a difference in steadfastness in carrying
through with the renunciations inescapably involved
in making choices.71

6 9I b i d ., p. 5 2 .
7^Max L e r n e r , The Age of Overkill (New York?
Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 206-207*
71 Charles B. Marshall, "The Limits of Foreign
Policy," as quoted in Jacobson, ojd. c i t ., p. 9&.
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Choices made by the President in decision-making guard
his influence.

They serve his p o w e r . ^ (The President’s

reputation is either made or altered by the man himself?
What he says; what he does; what he omits; or what he
does not do.

The President’s own conduct will decide

what other people and other nations think of him.

As

Neustadt stat es , the President’s reputation is a crucial
factor in determining whether he will be able to influ
ence
His general reputation will be shaped by signs of
pattern in the things he says and does.
These are
the words and actions he has chosen day by day.
His choices are the means by which he does what he
can do to build his reputation as he wants it.
Decisions are his building-blocks, He has no
others in his hands,73
His choices of what he will do and when and how-his choices also of whom he will tell and in what
way, and wor ds — are his means to protect this
source of influence, just as they are his means to
guard those other power sources? bargaining rela
tionships and professional reputation, , „ , A
President’s own prospects for effective influence
are regulated by his choices of objectives, and of
timing, and of instruments, and by his choice of
choices to avoid,74
For the President to make the most of power and
to guard his own reputation and prestige, he must under
stand the composition of power.

^Neustadt,
73

ojd ,

I b i d , , p, 64,

7^Ib i d , , p, 107,

According to Neustadt,

c i t ,, pp, 56-57,
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if the President wants power for the f u t u r e , he must
guard it in the p r es en t#

He protects his power, as best

he can, when he appraises the effects of present action
on the sources of his influence#

75

The President must act with resolve,
command, courage, coherence,

conviction,

constancy, conscientiousness,

and decisive f i r m n e s s ^ if he is to solve successfully
and effectively the many emergencies he is called upon to
meet#

His task is not an easy one, but his power to meet

and solve problems is only as great as his knowledge of
what power is and how to use it#
place for an amateur”

77

”The presidency is no

politician or statesman#

Effective leadership by the chief executive in
foreign policy requires that the following criteria be
met:
/"’ 1,
2#

I
i
\

V

3o

We must emphasize rather than belittle our
strengths if we are to keep our enemies con
vinced of our military superiority#
We must make every effort to impress on the
enemy that we have an unquestionable warwinning capability and that we have taken
adequate measures to preserve that capability o o
We must continuously demonstrate to our friends
and enemies, through both word and action, that
we have the determination to apply our military

7 5l b i d 0s p 0 181#
^ F o r definition of terms, see Finer, jO£# cit #,
pp# 120-147#
77ibid# , p# 124#

o

o
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superiority as may be necessary to protect
our interests and those of our all ie s.'/&
(Italics mine.)
(.^However difficult the challenge, the test of
deterrence strategy will be its ability to meet it.

When

all is said and done the TT, „ . great test of effectiveness
for any defense posture lies in its performance as the
basic guardian of American interestsn'?9 (italics mine);.

^Power,

©jo. cit o , p. 137.

?9william W„ Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy
(1st ed»; New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965)»
p. 251.
See also Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy (New York:
Harper, 1957), pp« 1-20 e

CHAPTER II

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION t

A DESIGN

FOR DETERRENCE

In the United States, every great "crisis period"
has been marked by the correspondingly powerful and strong
executive leadership of one man-=the President„

The terms

of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Jackson,
Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D, Roosevelt were periods of
aggressive and strong executive leadership,,

A-s Hirsch-

field has noted, "It is not surprising, therefore,
all of the ?Great Presidents®
1
periods of great crisis0"

that

have held office during

The Kennedy Administration was not without its
challenges and crisis periods,, ^In the first eight months
\

of the Kennedy Administration, the President was to face
a national recession, the Congo, Laos, the Bay of Pigs,
Berlin, nuclear testing, the United Nations, the Dominican
Republic, Cuba, Vietnam, and the race in space,)
The decade of the 1960's brought major changes to
the world on the international scene as well as on the

Hirschfield, ojp„ cit 0 , p„ 9°
51
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domestic fronts.

But one of the most hopeful and re

assuring events of the early 19605s was the election of
John F 0 Kennedy to the presidency of the United States.
To many, the election of the young, seemingly prophetic
senator from Massachusetts meant a rebirth of the asser
tiveness of the U.S.

in all spheres of activity.

Presi

dent Kennedy not only spoke of the many problems that
beset this country, but of the country5s latent greatness.
The urgency of his message was clear.

In the State of the

Union Message, in January 1961, President Kennedy said:
I speak today in an hour of national peril and
national opportunity.
Before my term has ended,
we shall have to test anew whether a nation organized
and governed such as ours can endure.
The outcome
is by no means certain.
The answers are by no means
clear.
All of us together--this Administration, this
Congress, this n a t i o n - m u s t forge those answers.2
Life in 1961 will not be easy. . . . There will
be further setbacks before the tide is turned.
But
turn it must.
The hopes of all mankind rest with
us | o o o3
So, with the orderly transition of power from one
administration to the next, the Kennedy Administration
prepared itself for the difficult task of rebuilding and
reasserting the political,

economic, military, and moral

capabilities of the U.S.
^John F. Kennedy, "State of the Union Message,"
January 29, 1961, in To Turn the T i d e , ed. John ¥.
Gardner (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 15-16.
^I b i d ., p. 33.
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All this will not be finished in the first one
hundred days*
Nor will it be finished in the first
one thousand days, nor in the life of this Adminis
tration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this
planet.
But let us be g i n ,b
John F, Kennedy in the White House
(This chapter will be concerned with identifying
and examining the statements made
he was campaigning for

by John Kennedy while

the office of President of the

United States and also the statements of policy enunci
ated in his first legislative year as President,

The

first year of a President's term is of more than ordinary
\

importance,)

In his first year the President "sets the

force and style of his Administration, and in large part
formulates the goals that will concern him throughout his
years in the White H o u s e , "5 ( This writer is interested in
knowing what John F, Kennedy said, what he did, and how
he acted.

Foreign policy objectives and interests are

what the foreign policy elite say they are; and in the
areas of f o r e i g n .policy the President's statements define
and clarify such objectives and interests.

The views the

President expresses concerning foreign policy are the
tangible evidence to the commitment and direction of the
nation itself^

"The history of this nation," said

^-Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961 ,
in To Turn the T i d e , o p , c i t ., p, 9»
^Gardner, o p . ci t ., "Editor’s Note."
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Kennedy, "its brightest and its bleakest pages--has been
largely written in terms of the different views our
Presidents have had of the Presidency itself."^
^ It has been said of John F. Kennedy that "No other
v.
President in history had been as well prepared for the
7
job*" j His knowledge of the office was excellent*

He had

spent years reading past histories and biographies of all
the "great Presidents*"
"*

As Theodore Sorensen has said,

* * he [the President] enjoyed reading Dick Neustadt?s

Presidential P o w e r , with its emphasis on personal power
and its politics; what it is, how to get it, how to keep
it, and how to use it."^

Kennedy brought to the White

House unusual firsthand knowledge of the foreign, domestic,
legislative, and political arenas, but no experience in
executive affairs*
affairs*

His area of expertise was in foreign

While a senator, he spent most of his years on

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

As a young sena

tor, Kennedy had on many occasions referred to the U . S . *s
tenuous position in world affairs, armaments, and economic
growth as inexcusable*

^Hirschfield,

Kennedy talked in terms of

ojd *

cit*, p* 5o

?Hugh Sidey, John F* Kennedy;
President
(New York:
Atheneum, 1965), p* 11*
d
Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Macmillan,
1965), p» 3$9o
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"problems and s o l u t i o n s K e n n e d y
and action0

believed in rationality

"As a grandchild of the Age of Reason,” as

Sidney Hyman has said, "Kennedy believed » ° « that pure
reason could make all good things happen as they say„”

10

Kennedy5s knowledge of the history of the presidency, of
the theory of presidential power, and of the techniques
of Congressional infighting was developed to a degree un
heard of in the histories of former Presidents.

Kennedy*s

political philosophy is clearly revealed in the following
r emarks:
Both the Constitution and practical experience
demonstrate that initiative in foreign affairs must
come from the Executive branch,.
It is the intractable and unresolved differences
within the Executive branch— and its failure of
nerve— that inhibit decisive action,,
It is finally a matter of demonstrating our
determination to defy any threats of blackmail, such
as those which were applied in the Suez crisis and
whose success obviously impressed the Soviet
leaders„11
I want to be a President known— at the end of
four years— as one who not only held back the Com
munist tide but advanced the cause"of freedom and
rebuilt American prest ige— not by words but by
deeds--not by stating great aims merely as a .good
9see Bernard Rossilep,/"Shadow*and Substance in
a New Frontier,” Progressive, XXVII (January 1963), 19°
1°Sidney Hyman, "The President in Power,”
Progressive » XXVII (January 1963)j 14°
1^John F„ Kennedy, "When the Executive Fails to
Lead,” The R ep o r t e r , XVIII (September 4, 195&), 15°
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debaterj but by doing great deeds as a good
neighbor--not by tours and conferences abroad,
but by vitality and direction at h o m e . . . .12
(Italics mine.)
(Kennedy*s philosophy was action-oriented; he
turned away from verbal solutions.

If the goals of peace,

freedom, justice, and prosperity were to triumph, they
must first become meaningful in concrete American d e e d s ,
not in propagandized policy exhortations^

The Kennedy

image was one of "sober common sense and resolute
action.

. .

executive show.

The Kennedy Administration was to be an
Kennedy's overall charge was that the

U.S. had been "drifting, slipping, and dawdling in the
world."

1i

In the campaign it became clear that only he

could provide the strong presidential leadership the nation
needed in the 1960's, or so he began to insist.

In a cam

paign speech delivered before the National Press Club, on
January 14, 1960, Kennedy spoke of the need for a strong
and determined leader to face and resolve the challenges
of the coming decade?

12John F. Kennedy, as quoted in James MacGregor
Burns, "Kennedy in Midpassage," Progressive, XXVII
(January 1963), 36.
^ R e i n h o l d Niebuhr, "Mistaken Venture,”-TheJNew
Lea de r, XLIV (May 1, 1961), 3»
^ T h e o d o r e Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (New York:
Macmillan, 1969), p. 69«
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In the coming y e a r s , we will need a real fighting
mood in the White H o u s e . „ . . In the decade that
lies ahead, the President must place himself in the
very thick of the fight. . . . He must be prepared to
exercise the fullest powers of his office— all that
are specified and some that are not, . . . The
President alone must make the major decisions of our
foreign policy."*5
^Kennedy had come to believe that what was necessary to
build the economic, military, and moral power of the nation
was "affirmative government”^ ^ directed by a strong Presi^
dent.J

As far as Kennedy was concerned, "there could be

no sign of weakness,""^ whether it was in domestic poli
cies, foreign policies, or administrative affairs.
(^Kennedy’s policy statements conveyed a sense of
\
concern, a vast command of information, and a mood of
decisive leadership.

In his Inaugural Address, President

Kennedy spoke of the determination and conviction of this
great nation to meet its commitments t
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well
or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose
any foe to assure the survival and success of
liberty.
o
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\Let all our neighbors know that we shall join
with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere
in the Americas.
And let every other power know that
this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its
own h ou s e .\ (italics mine.)
^ v i c t o r Lasky, J.F.K. The Man and the Myth
(New York? Macmillan, 1^63 ) , p. 31 3 <>
^ F o r an explanation of the term, see Lasky,
pp. 209-211.
^Sidey,

o£„ c i t ., p. 1$0.
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We dare not tempt them with weakness.
For only
when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be
certain beyond doubt that they will never be
employed.1°
Kennedy’s forceful language imparted an image of
steadfastness and certainty.

The firmness in his address

conveyed by such phrases as "pay any price” and "bear any
burden" was unmistakingly clear.

The conviction expressed

in Kennedy’s presidential speeches can also be found in
his campaign speeches.

They shed a particularly illustra

tive light on his policy goals, ideas, and objectives.
Most of Kennedy’s campaign speeches were typically a con
demnation of weak executive leadership in the nation and
a plea for strong,

creative leadership.

"Platitudes and

slogans” were to Kennedy "no substitutes for strength and
planning."

1Q
7

One of Kennedy’s caustic criticisms of the

Eisenhower Administration was its lack of long-range
planning, and the lack of a coherent and purposeful
national strategy backed by strength.

Kennedy’s policy

statements, as many historians have written, had "ringing
Rooseveltian overtones."

20

Kennedy was appealing to the

^ K e n n e d y , To Turn the T i d e , o p . c i t . ,
pp. 7-9ff.
19

7John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace
(New York:
Harper, .1960), see "Introduction."

20For further explanation, see Lasky, o p . cit.,
pp. 21-23.
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American instinct for the recovery of e l a n . ^

He had on

many occasions during his campaign stated that words and
discussion were not substitutes for strength,!, His message
and image were one of firmness and action in dealing with
the enemy:
Our task is to rebuild our strength and the
strength of a free wor ld — -to prove to the Soviets
that time and the course of history are not on
their side, that the balance of world power is not
shifting their way--and that therefore peaceful
settlement is essential to mutual survival, . . „
As a power we will never strike first, , , „ We
must regain the ability to intervene effectively
and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the
world, , , , tfe must begin to develop new workable
programs for peace and the control of arms, , , .
We must halt the spiraling arms race that burdens
the entire world with a fantastic financial drain,
excessive military establishments^ . , , We must
work to build the stronger America on which our
22
ultimate ability to defend the free world depends,
Kennedy's speeches were a strange blend of incom
patible policy objectives.

Build the strength of the

nation, but at the same time pursue peace and limitation
of weapons.

At times Kennedy emphasized that this country

must demonstrate that it has the capacity to defend itself
in a world of intercontinental-ballistic missiles, while
simultaneously expressing the belief that this country
21"Elan is something indefinable that sets in
motion all its forces and resources, stretching each to
the utmost and giving the ensemble its meaning,” See
Ler ne r, cjp, cit , , p. 233,
22Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, jDp, c i t ,, see
"Introduction.”
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must— -on American initiative— exploit every opportunity
that the dynamics of the change in Soviet life may offer
to move toward peace,,

In a speech given in Washington,

D.C., in January 1960, Kennedy said?
The first duty of an officer in a democratic
government is to uphold the integrity of words
used in public debate; and to do this by himself
using them in ways where they will stand as one
with the things they are meant to represent.23
The importance of such a duty can be seen in its role as
an influencing and communicational device which demon
strates your intentions to the enemy,, {The interpretation
of behavior in the international system is based on images
and statements of policy; and demonstrations of action
determine how the enemy evaluates the images.

Credibility

of words and threats is positively reinforced by decisive
action and firmness in dealing with aggressioi
/..

^ Kennedy’s approach to the Soviet Union appeared
unambiguous in his early campaign speechest

When he had

met Khrushchev in 1959> Kennedy said that he was ”shrewd,
tough, vigorous, well-informed, and confident

Kennedy

went on to say,
No, Khrushchev has left no doubt of his selfconfidence— and I am equally confident that, in con
ditions of peace, we can see freedom thrive and
s p r e a d - e v e n someday to Mr. Khrushchev’s grand
children. . . . It may be that an agreement in the

23I b i d ., p. 3.
2^ I b i d „, p . 5 »
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control and limitation of nuclear tests will be the
beginning. . . . Another dramatic step that might
reverse the present problem would be an agreement
on general disarmament and demilitarization for some
particular area of tension,,25
We look for deeds not w o r d s .
offer d e e d s , not wor ds .

And we too must
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We need a new approach to the Eussians--one that
i-s -iust as hard-headed and .1ust as realistic as
Mr. Khrushchev's but one that might well end the
current phase— the frozen, belligerent, brink-of-war
phase— of the long cold war. . . . All this we can
do, with imagination, patience, determination, and
above all, effort„26
(Italics mine.)

Iks John Kennedy had made clear, strong words alone do not
make meaningful policy; they must, in foreign affairs in
particular, be backed both by a will and by weapons that
are really strong.

27

1 Kennedy’s position made clear

Amer ic a’s goal;
. o . convincing the Soviet leaders that it is dan
gerous for them to engage in direct or indirect
aggression, futile for them to attempt to impose
their will and their system on other unwilling
people and beneficial to them, as well as to the
world to join in tim^achievement of a genuine and
enforceable peace.2 oj
Such an undertaking meant a determined search for peace,
a willingness to negotiate, a will to explore problems
2 5I b i d ., p . 2 9 o
26I b i d ., pp. 11-12.
2 ^See Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, o p . ci t.,
"Introduction,” p. xvi.
7$
^ N e a l Riemer, "Kennedy’s Grand Democratic
Design," Review of Politics, XXVII (January 1965)? 10.
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mutually, and the need to find areas of cooperation,,
Kennedy was keenly aware of the dangers of nuclear war,
and he sought to prevent violence and distrust from repro
ducing themselves.

He sought to return to the path of

29
"accommodation,” 7

William Leuchtenburg has gone as far

as to say that once Kennedy was in office,
Z.He directed his efforts both toward reaching an arms
agreement and toward effecting a rapprochment with
the Soviet Union,,
In fact, Kennedy was pursuing as
peaceful a course as events would permit, „ , . He
refused to act except under extreme provocation, , . ,
Kennedy pushed for a detente with the Soviet Union,
policies speak for themselves.

His

To him, the only authentic

alternative to mutual annihilation was negotiation]

"Let

us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to
negotiate.Kennedy

spoke eloquently of achieving

peace in a world in which there existed only violence,
crisis, and aggression.
29ihe Kennedy brand of accommodation cannot be
defined as "capitulation” but his willingness to negotiate
reflected an image of reserve in using force to his advan
tage,
His paths of accommodation gravely decreased the
credibility of the U.S. threat posture.
See Sorensen,
K ennedy, o p , cit ., p. 515*
3°William E. Leuchtenburg, "J.F.K,
American R e v i e w , III (Winter 1963), 25-27.

1917-1963,”

^ K e n n e d y , To Turn the T i d e , o p . c i t . , p. 9.
Similar views of K e n ne dy ’s willingness to negotiate and
reach accommodation are expressed by James A, Wechsler,
"John F. Kennedy?
A Retrospect," Progressive, XXVIII
(January 1964), 12-13.
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^The viability of the Kennedy image was never
better demonstrated than on the war-and-peace issuer
n . . . Kennedy was a man of peace.

. . ."32

He wanted

to answer Soviet threats aiid probes of American resolve
”firmly but not harshly
A New Approach to International Affairs
and Nuclear Strategy?
Cuba, L a o s ,
Berlin, and the Soviet Union
'
vIn the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had
taken firm stands on several issues.

\

prominent issues was Cuba>
Johnstown, Pennsylvania,

One of the most

In a campaign speech at

on October 1 5 s 1960, Kennedy had

said of his Republican rival, Richard Nixon:
L.No , Nixon ha s n ’t mentioned Cuba very prominently
in this campaign,.
He talks about standing firm in
Berlin, standing firm in the Far East, standing up
to Khrushchev.
But he never mentions standing firm
in Cuba.
And if you c a n ’t stand firm in Cuba, how
can you be expected to stand up to Khrushchev. . . .
The transformation of Cuba into a Communist base of
operations a few minutes from our coast— by jet plane,
missile or submarine--is an incredibly dangerous
development t ^ have been permitted by our Republican
policy-makers .'34
32Lasky, ojd. c i t . , p. 366.
Kennedy stressed the
value of negotiations, the need for multilateral and non
military responses and the use of limited steps that made
clear the nation’s intent without forcing the other side
to the wall.
He wanted any conflict to be confined, not
widened or escalated.
His aversion to the use of mili
tary force was apparent.
33sidey, o£. c i t . , p.
34john F. Kennedy, as quoted in Elie Abel, The
Missile Crisis (New York:
J. B. Lippincott, 1966), p. 12.
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The implication was clears

Kennedy was promising

more aggressive action against Castro.

Kennedy flatly

charged that Eisenhower and Nixon had had a do-nothing
policy toward Cuba.

Warning of the presence of a Commu

nist foothold only 90 miles from our sh o r e s , Kennedy
promised to do something about it if elected; n „ . « with
in 90 days" after assuming the presidency he would reassert
American leadership at home and a b r o a d . ^

At a California

Democratic Council meeting in Fresno on February 12, 1960,
Kennedy saids

'tfWe cannot afford in the turbulent sixties

the persistent indecision of a James Buchanan,5 which
caused Ohi o5s Senator Sherman to say,

5The Constitution

provides for every accidental contingency in the Execu
tive— except a vacancy in the mind of the President.5”^6

f
I Kennedy's commitment and concern over Cuba and
the growing menace are revealed in the following campaign
utterances r
August 24» 1960
For the first time in the history of the United
States an enemy stands poised at the threshold of
the United States.
I think it is -a source of maximum danger.
I
think the big task for the next administration is
going to be to contain this revolution in Cuba
at s eIf o . o o ^

^^Lasky , ojd. c i t ., pp. 470-76ff.
^ I b i d ., p. 361 .
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October 15. I960
We must let Mr. Castro know that we do not in
tend to be pushed around any longer, . . . W e must
let Mr. Khrushchev know that we are permitting no
expansion of his foothold in our hemisphere. . . .
October 20, 1960
We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista,
democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in
Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing
Castro.

;\
j

!
■■
i

October 23, 1960
j
I have never advocated and I do not now advocate /■'
intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty obli
gations and in fact stated . . . that whatever we did
in regard to Cuba should be within the confines of./
international law.37
As John F. Kennedy became the thirty-fifth Presi
dent of the United States, he had made up his mind:
^ " C a s t r o has to go because he is dangerous to American
security.

. . .”3$

The Kennedy attitude was reflected in

the following passage in the President’s first State of
the Union message:

’’Questions of economic trade policy

can always be negotiated.

But Communist domination in

39

this hemisphere can never be negotiated.”'

As the Presi

dent himself remarked to one aide, ”We c an’t go on living
with this Castro cancer for ten years more.”

The U.S.

37

John F . Kennedy, ’’Campaign Speeches,” in InterAmerican Economic A f f a ir s, XV (Winter 1961), 79-95.
3^Tristiam Coffin, ’’Kennedy and Crisis,” The New
L e ad er , XLIV (May 1961), 6-7.
•^Kennedy, To Turn the T i d e , o p . cit., p. 23.
^•Ojohn F. Kennedy, as quoted in Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago:
Quadrangle,
19 6 4 ), p. 241.
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position was further clarified in the Cuban "White Paper"
of April 3s 1961, in which "the revolution betrayed" was
presented as both "a grave and urgent challenge" and "’a
/1
clear and present danger" to the hemisphere„
/ X.
^In other areas of international crises, such as
Laos and Berlin, the Kennedy Administration was just as
emphatic in stating its resolve and determination to protect vital national interests.}

The Kennedy position on

Laos involved maintaining the freedom and self-determina
tion of its people:

/~
\

V_W@ seek in Laos what we seek in all Asia, and
indeed, in all the world: freedom for the people
and independence for the government. And this
nation shall persevere in our pursuit of these ob
jectives 0
We strongly and unreservedly support the goal
of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no out
side power or group of powers, threatening no one,
and free from any domination. . . . If there is to
be a peaceful solution, there must be a cessation
of the present armed attacks by externally supported
Communistso
If these attacks do not stop, those who
support a genuinely neutral Laos will have to con
sider their response0
No one should doubt our resolution on this point.
We are faced with a clear threat of a change in the
internationally agreed position of Laos.
O O O O O
O O O O O © O O O O O O O
0 O O O O o 0 O o
I want to make it clear to the American people,
and to all the world, that all we want in Laos is
peace, not war; a truly neutral government, not a
Cold War pawn; . 0
4lFor full context of "White Paper," see the
New York T i m e s , April 26, 1961.
^ K e n n e d y , To Turn the T i d e , o p . c i t . , pp. 23-41»
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(Tin Berlin, a historical and geographical core
interest of the U.S., the President’s messages unmistakingly revealed an earnest and firm commitment to pro
tect Berlin ”at any risk .A

After Kennedy had returned

from the Vienna talks with Khrushchev, he stated that he
had made it clear to Khrushchev that,
o o * our [U*S*] security of Western Europe, and
therefore our own security, are deeply involved in
our presence and our access rights to West Berlin,
that those rights are based on law and not on suf
ferance, and that we are determined to maintain
those rights at any risk, and thus meet our obliga
tion to the people of West Berlin and their right
to choose their future*43
In another statement made six days later on a ’’Report to
the Nation on the Berlin Crisis,” Kennedy made the follow
ing remarks t
In Berlin, as you recall, he;, [Khrushchev] intends
to bring.an end, through a stroke of the pen, first,
our legal rights to be in West Berlin and, second,
our ability to make good on our commitment to the two
million free people of that city that we cannot per
mit* * * * But if we and our allies act out of strength
and unity of purpose, with calm determination and
steady nerves, using restraint in our words as well
as our weapons, I am hopeful that both peace and free
dom will be sustained*

C
\ W e s t Berlin has now become, as never before, the
great testing place of Western will in Europe and . * .
we cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive
us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force* . , *
We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples
of West Berlin, and maintain our rights and their
safety* * * * We intend to have a wider choice than
humiliation or all-out nuclear acti on *)
43i b i d * * pp* 1B2-1B3.

In short, while we are ready to defend our
interests, we shall also be ready to search for
peace, in quiet, exploratory talks, in formal or
informal meetings,44

r
!
vlt is with some irony that Kennedy should go on to say
that if "we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where
will we later stand7 ^

If we are not true to our word

there, all that we have achieved in collective security
which relies on these words, will mean nothing.

And if

there is one path above all others to war, it is the path
i

/L

of weakness and disunity,"
v--vvIt was clear that Khrushchev had chosen Berlin as
a chief battleground for the Cold War, as a major "'test
of w i l l s " ; and Kennedy had vigorously pledged and com
mitted this eountry.

If necessary "we will fight,"

security of Berlin cannot be negotiated^
tiate with those who say,

The

"We cannot nego-

’W h a t ’s mine is mine and w h a t ’s

yours is negotiable,5"47
^"Berlin was a crucial testing place for U.S. resolve.

If the U.S. exhibited any kind of weakness in ful

filling its obligation, or was driven or squeezed out of
^ I b i d , . pp, 1S9-19 7 .
^ i m p l i c i t l y the answer to that question is "in a
defensive, reactionary position in the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962," due to the failure of decision-making at
a much earlier stage,
^ K e n n e d y , To Turn the T i d e , o p . c i t . , pp. 177-197<
47ibid. , p. 194 .
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West Berlin, the Soviet Union would interpret this as an
indication that the U.S.'. NATO guarantee to defend Europe
was m e a n i n g l e s s . ^
A cursory review of President Kennedy’s policy
statements on international affairs also requires a brief
examination of security policy.^9

f

[During the early 1960’s, the strategy of deter
rence was a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy, par
ticularly in its relations with the Soviet Union . ^

’’Our

strategy,” writes Stagner, ’’vis-a-vis the Communist block
is one of deterrence.”^"*
The security objectives of the U.S. and its deter
rence strategy were defined by President Kennedy in his
’’Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget” on
March 2$, 19 6 1 .

This document, Robert Ginsburg has

written, ” . . . remains today the best brief statement of
our security policy.” 5^

President Kennedy began with the

following statement t

^ C f . , e.g., John W. Spanier, World Revolution in
the Age of Revolution (New York?
Praeger, 1965), especi
ally pp. 228-30ff, in which the author describes all
Soviet challenges to American power in Berlin as only
limited challenges of Western rights.
^9For definition of ’’security,” see supr a, p.
^OMilburn, _op. cit ., p. 174.
^Stagner,

op. cit., p. SO.

^^Ginsburg, op. c i t ., p. 62.
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fUhe primary purpose of our arms is peace, not
w a r — -to make certain that they will never have to
be used— to deter all wars, general or limited,
nuclear or conventional, large or small'— to convince
all aggressors that any attack would be futile--to
provide backing for diplomatic settlement of disputes— to insure the adequacy of our bargaining power
for an end to the arms race. . , . Our military pos
ture must be sufficiently flexible and under control
to be consistent with our efforts to explore all
possibilities and to take every step to lessen ten
sions, to obtain^peaceful solutions, and to secure
arms limitations.^3
Kennedy went on to the consideration of the basic defense
policies:
■{Our arms will,never be used to strike the first
blow'"'in any attack. . . . We must offset whatever
advantage this may appear to hand an aggressor by so
increasing the capability of our forces to respond
swiftly and effectively to any aggressive move^as to
convince any would-be aggressor that such a movement
would be too futile and costly to undertake. . » .
Our arms must be subject to ultimate civilian
control and command at all times, in war as well as
peace.
The basic decisions on our participation in
any conflict and our response to any threat—
including all decisions relating to the use of
nuclear weapons, or the escalation of a small war
into a large one-~will be made by the regularly con
stituted civilian authorities. . . .54
These brief statements do not provide all the answers to
American security problems, but they do outline basic
strategic goals.

On the other hand, these statements

raise several questions about American military strategy

^ T h e President of the United S t a t e s , Recommenda
tions Relating to Our Defense Budget (Washington, D.C.t
Government Printing Office, 1961) (House Document No. 123),
pp. 1-2.
Hereafter cited as Budget Recommendations.

5^Ibid., p p B 3-4o

which the President did not answer. / Do these policy
statements preclude the U.S. initiating hostilities when
our core interests are threatened by enemy aggression
which does not include outright military action?
implication is not clear.

The

Does the policy of not striking

"the first blow in any attack" rule out the possibility
of the U.S". never striking first with nuclear weapons as
a response to successful enemy non-nuclear aggressions?
If the answer to such questions can be considered affirma
tive , the credibility of deterrence strategy is greatly
weakened, if not zero.

Credibility of nuclear threats and

retaliation is not normally increased by making such
statements as, "Our arms will never be used to strike the
first blow in any attack.

. . ."

These statements tend to

deflate and make highly incredible--in the eyes of the
aggressor--the U . S . ’s threats and policy commitments.

One

doe sn ’t make a potential enemy believe that his defense
posture and deterrence strategy is credible by saying that
he will not use it to prevent aggression.

President

K ennedy’s security statements left in doubt the U.S.'s
intentions to use its most vital asset— its power as perceived by the enemy.
In the matter of strategic war planning, President
Kennedy stated two basic principles?
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i
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\

\

(1) Our strategic arms and defenses must be ade
quate to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the
United States or our allies . . . <»
(2) Our defense posture must be designed to reduce
the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general
war--the danger of an unnecessary escalation of a
small war into a large one, or of miscalculation or
misinterpretation of an incident or enemy
intention. . . .55
For the Administration’s policy concerning limited

war, President Kennedy’s first defense budget message is
instructive v
.
In the event of a major aggression that could not
be repulsed by conventional forces, we must be pre
pared to take whatever action with whatever weapons
are appropriate,. But our objective no w is to increase
our ability to confine our response to nonnuclear
weapons, and to lessen the incentive for any limited
aggression by making clear what our response will
accomplish,,
Our weapon systems must be usable in a manner per
mitting deliberation and discrimination as to timing,
scope, and targets in response to civilian author
ity; „ o o There must be no uncertainty about our
determination and capacity to take whatever steps are
necessary to meet our obligations.5°
President Kennedy’s explanation of the new emphasis
on conventional and non-nuclear forces was that?
Our strength may be tested at many levels. We
intend to have at all times the capacity to resist
nonnuclear or limited attacks— as a complement to our
nuclear capacity, not a substitute. We have rejected
any all-or-nothing posture which would leave no
choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retali
ation. . „ .57
55ib i d . , pp. 3 ”4o

56ibid.
57president John F. Kennedy, State of the Union
, January 11, 1962.
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Secretary of Defense McNamara addressed the problem in the
following manner:
Even in limited war situations we should not pre
clude the use of tactical nuclear weapons. . . . But
the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons in
limited conflicts should not be forced upon us simply
because we have no other means to cope with them. . . .
What is being proposed at this time is not a reversal
of our existing national policy but an increase in our
nonnuclear capabilities to provide a greater degree
of versatility to our limited war forces.5$
These remarks did not clarify the U . S . ’s position
concerning the use of nuclear weapons; doubts still re
mained. { On another occasion McNamara stated:

”It would

be our policy to use nuclear weapons wherever we felt it
necessary to protect our forces and achieve our objec
tives.
'These policy statements bring into question the
U . S . ?s determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary,
particularly in Europe.

This and the Administration’s

NATO strategy weakened the credibility of the U.S;.!s
willingness to use nuclear weapons./
The outlines of the new U.S. NATO policy were
described by Kennedy in Ottawa on May 17, 1961:

5 % . S’. , House of Representatives, Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 196 2, Hearings, S7th Cong., 1st S e s s .,
Part 3 (Washington, D.G.:
Government Printing Office,
1961), pp. 18-19.

59Ibid., p. 137.
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Our NATO alliance is still, as it was when it
was founded, the world's greatest bulwark of free
dom, , „ , Now if we are to meet the defense require
ments of the 1960®s the NATO countries must push
forward simultaneously along two major lines.
First, we must strengthen the conventional capa
bility of our alliance as a matter of the highest
priority.
Second, we must make certain that nuclear weapons
will continue to be available for the defense of the
entire treaty area, and that these weapons are at all
times under close and flexible political control that
meets the needs of all NATO countries.^0
K ennedy’s remarks on U.S, defense policy did not explain
the strategic thinking and concepts that were the founda
tion of such a policy, j Furthermore, his aversion to a
conventional build-up weakened the credibility of the
nuclear deterrent; and in light of the Soviet U n i o n ’s over
whelming military superiority in conventional forces in
Europe, U,S, conventional build-up was meaningless ^?'
This chapter is an attempt to review only a few
of President Kennedy’s major policy objectives, statements,
and beliefs.

Kennedy projected himself as a strong, reso

lute chief executive who would get the country moving
again.

He pledged himself and his Administration to solve

60president John F, Kennedy, ’’Address to Members
of the Senate and House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada,"
May 17, 1961.
6^Cf., e.g,, William Wo Kaufmann, up. c i t ,,
pp, 101-15»
Kaufmann presents a detailed analysis of
President Kennedy's NATO strategy in Europe.
His remarks
are rather critical of President Kennedy's defense
policy.

problems, to rebuild the strength and prestige of the

\

U.S. in world affairs which had been weakened in the
Eisenhower Administration,,

He stated eloquently:

\

"I am

determined upon our system®s survival and success,
regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril
The President had pledged to stop reacting to the enemy^s
moves and to start acting like the bold, hopeful, inventive people that Americans were thought to be. *

For if

we failed to act the U.S. would find itself at the "’mercy
of events” instead of anticipating the danger and shaping
a firm and consistent policy to meet i t . ^
r"
T^ese were the statements and policies of John F.
Kennedy.
tions.

They conveyed his principles and his convic
The real test of any administration is not what

it says, but what it does--not what it might do, but what
it will do.

Credibility of deterrence strategy requires

that the deterrer demonstrate his willingness to employ
force with concrete, positive action.

The ultimate test

£^
John F. Kennedy, as cited in Edward P. Morgan,
”U„S'„ Policy and Social Revolution,” Hew L e a d e r , XLIV
(May 1, 1961), 5« For an exceptionally well-written
analysis of the Kennedy Administration, see Richard
Neustadt, "Kennedy in the Presidency,” Political Science
Quarterly, LXXXIX (September 1964), 321-34.
63por further elaboration of comments, see
John F. Kennedy, The Burden of Glory (New York:
Harper
and Row, 1964), pp. 225-27.
^ I b i d ., p. 227.
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of effectiveness of any defense policy is determined by
|
its performance in the field of b a t t l e ^
Chapter III will be concerned with examining the
performance of deterrence strategy in the Kennedy Adminis
tration in world affairs, through the analysis of the
deterrence model developed in Chapter I, to determine
whether the "subjective f a c t o r s " ^ Gf American policy were
present„
^ F o r explanation of "subjective factors," see
supra, p p 0 8- 9 o .

CHAPTER I I I

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES:
A SIGN OF WEAKNESS

k'Fhis chapter will be concerned with examining the
five international crises (i.e., American-Cuban relations,
the Bay of Pigs, Laos, Vienna, and the Berlin Wall) to
determine whether the T?!sub jective factors” of American
foreign policy were in fact present in each one of these
criseso

In each case it will be shown that President

Kennedy greatly weakened the credibility of deterrence
strategy*

His actions in dealing with each one of these

crises illustrate his inconsistency in pursuing policy
objectives, the discrepancies between his stated inten
tions , and his actual behavior in handling these crises*
These discrepancies became more obvious to the Soviet
leaders as Kennedy was confronted by each crisis and be
haved in a manner which was irresolute, indecisive, and
counterproductive*

His actions in dealing with these

crises made incredible our deterrence strategy and its
- ...

threat components* \
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American-Cuban Relations;
of Failure

A Decade

I To say that American foreign policy goals toward
Cuba have been confused and undefinable is an under
statement,,

U.S.. relations with Cuba have

demonstrated

the ” . „ . failure of American foreign policy."^

The

history of American-Cuban relations has been one of
American economic exploitation, military intervention,
and general Mcultural arrogance,,”

o

Probably one of the

greatest failures in American-Cuban relations was the
ineptness of our economic policy and the failure to worry
about or understand the Cuban revolution.j
The question of why the U.S. has been unable to
act as a first-class power in the Caribbean deserves to
be answered in an objective manner,

(Cuba has been recog

nized as a vital core interest of the U.S. for many years.
Cuba, ”unlike other areas of conflict in the Cold War, is
geographically close”^ and traditionally the area has

^Adolf A. Berle, Jr., ”The Cuban Crises,” Foreign
Affairs 9 XXXIX (October 1960) , 40.
^For a discussion of this concept, see Bayless
Manning, ”An Overall Prospective,” in John Plank, Cuba
and the U.S.:
Long Range Perspectives (Washington, B . C . :
Brookings Institute, 1967), pp. 224-22$; also David L,
Larson, The Cuban Crisis (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin,

^Paul Ekman, et a l . , "Coping with Cuba,” Journal
of Conflict R es ol ut io n, X (June 1966), 130.
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been deemed so vital to the security of the U.S. that it
would consider a threat to that area as a threat to its
own security.

"For over a century the Monroe Doctrine

defined the diplomatic behavior of the United States toward the Western Hemisphere."]4' President Kennedy, early
in 1961, had said:
The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant
since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams
enunciated it, and that is that we oppose a
foreign power extending its power to the Western
Hemisphere.5
r;The Kennedy Administration was

firmly opposed to the exten

sion of any foreign power into

the Western Hemisphere; the

U.S. would take

care of itsown backyard.

But at the

same

time the U.S. was committed to the principle of "’non
intervention" in the internal affairs of other countries.
"Washington was

reluctant to take any step that might seem

to violate this

principlePresident

Kennedy had

^ C r ab b, o p . c i t ., p. 2 6 5 . Basically, the Monroe
Doctrine provided for the self-defense of nations of the
Western Hemisphere, which is the inherent right of a
sovereign state, and non-intervention in European affairs.
See Ramin H. Hulsey, "The Cuban Revolution," Journal of
International A f f a ir s, XIV, No. 2 (1960), 158.
5John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Charles 0. Lerche,
"The Monroe loctrine; Cold War Anachronism:
Cuba and the
Dominican Republic," Journal of Politics, XXVIII
(May 1960), 323.
^Crabb, 0£. c i t . , p. 273» For a discussion of the
historical development of U.S. non-intervention policy in
Cuba, see Raymond Carr, "The Cold War in Latin America,"
in Plank, op>. cit., pp. 158- 161.
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/established the principle that this country's foreign
policy goals toward Cuba meant ".
the Communist orbit» . .

. keeping her out of

If this was the policy of

the U.S. government, it certainly had a strange way of
showing it 4
Kennedy stated while he was campaigning for the
presidency that the failure of the U.S.. foreign policy in
Cuba could be attributed to lack of understanding and
perspective.

He went on to says

c
The story of the transformation of Cuba from a
friendly ally to a Communist base is— in large
measure— the story of a government in Washington
which lacked the imagination and compassion to
understand the needs of the Cuban people— which
lacked the leadership and vigor to move forward to
meet those needs— and which lacked the foresight
and vision to see the inevitable result of its
own failureo°
Kennedy had even gone as far as to say in his
Strategy of Peace that t
Fidel Castro is part of the legacy of [Simon]
Bolivar [the great Latin American liberator] who
led his men over the Andes Mountains, vowing "war
to the deatho . . ." Castro is also part of the
frustration of that earlier revolution which won
its war against S p a i n » . . .9
( According to Kennedy,
^Hulsey,

PPo

ojd .

it was the U.S.'s failure to give
cit . , p» 172.

(See s u p r a , pp.

Kennedy, "Campaign Speeches," jdjj. cit .,
79-94.

^Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace,
ci t.,
p p 0 132=33.
See also Sidey, 0£ o cit a » p a 446.

-

.)
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Cuba sufficient economic aid that turned the people
against us, paving the way for conversion of Cuba to
,TCommunism* s first Caribbean base.”

Kennedy said that?

(1) We refused to help Cuba meet its desperate need
for economic progress, and
(2 ) We used the influence of our government to
advance the interests and increase the profits
of the private American companies which domi
nate the island’s economy.
(.The contradiction between these statements and Kennedy’s
strong interventionist policy ("We must attempt to
strengthen the non-Batista, democratic anti-Castro forces
in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of
overthrowing Castro.

Thus far these fighters for freedom

have had virtually no support from our Governmental1) is
further compounded by a later statement in which he said:
kj have never advocated and I do not advocate
intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty
obligations. . . . What I have advocated is that
we use all available communications— radio, tele
vision and the press— and the moral power of the
American Government, to let the forces pf freedom
in Cuba know that we are on their side^f 2
l^These statements are so totally contradictory and conv\.

fusing that viable policy goals and objectives concerning
Cuba are indeed undefinable'l

At one point Kennedy

^^John Fo Kennedy, as quoted in Lasky, o p . ci t. ,
p. 447.
Ibid., p. 450.
See also Kennedy, The Burden
.22® ci t»8 P«
70.

^^John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Lasky, _op. c i t .,
p. 454<
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^criticizes the Eisenhower Administration for not under
standing the Cuban people and their leader, while later
he advocates intervention while simultaneously pledging
himself to adhere to the principle of "non-intervention,"
As President he pledged to "oppose a foreign power extend
ing its power to the Western Hemisphere," while simul
taneously acting with complacency and ambivalence toward
the Soviet military buildup in Cuba)

Although President

Kennedy had once stated,that Fidel Castro is part of the
j

legacy of SimonBolivar, as Castro's revolution continued
its radical bent through agrarian reforms and U , S » capital
expropriations the future coordinator of Latin-American
affairs for the Kennedy Administration, Adolf A, Berle, Jr.,
took the position that the Castro regime had "betrayed
the revolution," and that the Gommunization of Cuba had
followed the classic tactical pattern of the Soviet
model,^ ^
(tn 1959? when the Castro regime came into power,
there was a rapid disintegration of Guban-A'merican rela
tions ,\ The U.S. government accused the Cuban government
of executing civilians, expropriating capital without com
pensation, destroying the press autonomy, recognizing
Communist China, accepting aid from the Soviet Union,

^ S e e "White Paper on Cuba," New York T i m e s ,
April 2 6 , 1961,

S3
allowing Communists to infiltrate the government, pro
moting revolution throughout Latin America, and depriving
U.S. officials of their lawful, personal freedoms«

By-

January 1961, the U.S. had broken diplomatic relations
with Cuba and had branded the Castro revolution as Commu
nist .

That Cuba had identified with the Soviet Union was

more a fault of the U.S. government than any particular
1 *5
propensity Castro had for Communism,, J

"I believe his

tory,” Charles Osgood has written, ’’will ultimately record
that we literally drove the Cuban revolution into the
arms of the Soviet Union and Communism,,”
toward Cuba was ambivalent,

16

U.S. policy

inasmuch as it did not under-

stand the nature of the revolution,, \ While professing
^ R i c h a r d Fagen, a very well-known and respected
Latin American scholar, presents in his work The Trans
formation of the Political Culture (Stanford, Calif ,t
Stanford University Press, 1962) a thorough analysis of
the interplay of U.S., foreign policy in Cuban affairs,,
His position is far from neutral,,
^ 5lt is indeed difficult to pinpoint the exact
moment when the Castro movement began its fateful turn to
the left towards the Communists. Perhaps this is so be
cause at the beginning the turnings were subtle, mysteri
ous, and impenetrable. For a discussion of these facts,
see U„S'», Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Events
in United States-Cuban Relations (Washington. B.C.;
Government Printing Office, January 2 9 s 1963); also U . S . ,
Department of State, C u b a , Publication No. 7171 (Washington;
D.C.:
Government Printing Office, April 1961).
I^Gharles E„ Osgood, Perspective in Foreign
(Urbana, 111.;
[no publisher given], 19651 , p. 31°
For a similar view, see Robert F. Smith, The United
States and Cuba (New York; Bookman Associates , 1960),.

commitment to the idea of national self-determination,
the U.S. had tended to support the status quo and resist
change.

("The United States must share the blame for the

situation which erupted into the Cuban trek toward
Moscow." j

Our relations have not only been characterized

by errors and shortsighted policies, but we failed to
recognize in the underdeveloped areas the significance of
the wave of "rising expectations” among the disadvantaged<>
TJ. S. leaders failed to assist the Cuban revolution when
it most urgently needed assistance.
is that a void in policy did exist.”

"What is important
1$

Tretiak has so realistically summarized:

And as Daniel
"The severance

of Cuban-U.S', relations in 1961 left it to the U,S.S.R.
to meet G u b a ?s excessively ambitious economic and politi
cal demands.”^9

This severance was the culmination of a

policy towards Cuba which reflected the history of U.S.
relations wit h all of Latin America--neglects economic
exploitation and, by and large, inept diplomacy,

(in the

years preceding the Cuban revolution, U.S. attention was
fixed on the Soviet challenge in other parts of the world
to the neglect of Latin America, which was assumed to be
^Smith,

op. c i t ., p. 27»

^ H a y e s Johnson, _et al., The Bay of Pigs (New York
Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 25o
S p a n i e l Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union,”
O r b i s . XI (September 1967), 440.

safe.

2

/

T,If statesmanship requires a sense of history,w'

as Arthur Whitaker has noted, nit also requires accurate
knowledge, sound interpretation, and skill in projecting
the results of the interplay between the ever active historical forces of continuity and change.n^1

( President

Kennedy had expressed his understanding of the Cuban
problem many times. His policy was strikingly similar to
pp
the Castro line.
But when it came time to make deci
sions about the fate of Cuban-American relations, American
policy was Tl. . . characterized by ambiguity„ . .
American policy in the Kennedy Administration not only
alienated Cubans from U.S. capitalism but also from the
Western tradition i t s e l f . ^

When the Kennedy Administra

tion announced it had severed diplomatic relations with
Cuba, it had in effect, according to Earl E. T„ Smith,
20
^uC f ., Andres Suarez, Cuba?
Castroism and Commu
nism (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1967).
21 Arthur P. Whitaker, "Yankeephobiat The U.S.
and L . A „,n Current History, ILII (January 1962), 15»
22pere I am referring to Castro's accusations
concerning American economic exploitation and military
intervention.
23Whitaker, op. ci t. , p. 15.
24-Maurice Zeitlin, Cuba:

Tragedy in Our Hemis-

similar views, especially on pp. 142-20$.
See also
Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1 945~
1966 (New York:
Wiley, 1967), pp. 214-l6ff.
——
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caused a type of "negative intervention."2 5

Smith goes

on to state that many people may have been sincerely mis
led by Castro, but the Department of State and the United
States cannot afford to be misled or "to excuse such mis
takes by saying that the revolution was betrayed by
Castro."

Maurice Zeitlin has aptly depicted U.S. in-

eptness in dealing with the social revolution in Cuba?
(^During the period the U.S. had an opportunity
to "extend economic aid to a professed anti
communist nationalistic revolution, and thus re
turn, if not its friendship, at least its cor
diality*
However, it did not do so)27
The U.S. did not act and the Kennedy Administration
exacerbated the situation by severing relations with Cuba,
which had been a core interest of the U . S * for over 50

^ F o r definition'of term, see Earl E„ T. Smith,
The Fourth Floor (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 226.
The psychological effect of withdrawal of American support
was devastating*
Smith called it intervention by innuendo.
26Ibi d * , pp* 233-34.
For a splendid discussion
of U.S. policy failure in Cuba, see Herbert Dinerstein,
Intervention Against Communism (Baltimore:* Johns Hopkins
Press7 1967;
Dinerstein qualifies many of his remarks
concerning U*S:* policy failures by saying:
"Great powers
rarely act with perfect wisdom and foresight, especially
in their dealings with small powers" (p. 42)*
27zeitlin, o p * c i t * , p* 36*
That the Soviet
Union filled the vacancy left by the U.S. was an unex
pected victory for the Communists, according to Herbert
Dinerstein, who is a highly recognized Kremlinologist*
See Herbert Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America,"
American Political Science R e v i e w , LXI (March 1967),
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y ea r s .

The purpose behind such actions was not clear„

At one point President Kennedy spoke of coming to a
better understanding with our Latin American n eighbors,
while at the same time he pursued a contradictory pol ic y «
/The great confusion in our relations with the Cubans
w o o o arises from the uncertainty as to what our policy
really isc”^

Charles Osgood described President Kennedy's

foreign policy toward Cuba as "1

„ . the ambivalence of

the mighty American elephant in dealing with the little
Cuban mouse."^9

The frustrations and contradictions of

UoSo foreign policy toward Cuba made it "the most vulner
able area for Soviet penetration of the hemisphere in the
Cold War of^

Ambassador to M e x i c o , Robert Hill, at times

a critic of President Kennedy's policies in Latin America,
was "shocked by intelligence reports that the Soviets were
amazed at the ease with which they were being permitted
to penetrate Cuba <>"31

The Kennedy Administration was

certainly not taking care of its own backyard»

"American

policy and American diplomacy avoided giving any pretext
for hostility, and acted with remarkable moderation in
2%mith,

The Fourth F l o o r , o p 0 ci t0 , p. 228„

29charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Sur
render (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 19 & 2 ) ~
p„ 2 0 o
3®Lester Do Langley, The Cuban Policy of the
United Slates (New York:
Wiley, 19 6 8 ), "Introduction."
3"*Lazo, ££0 cito , p p 0 184 - 8 5 .

S3
the face of growing provocation.”3^

^Instead of aiding

the Cuban revolutionaries, the U.S. forfeited this role
to the Communist bloc, a fact to which the Kennedy
Administration did not respond\

)

The Bay of Pigs: The S'tigma
of Indecision
jThe Kennedy Administration had pledged action
against Cuba.

The contingency plans had been put to use

and the freedom fighters were trained,,

The American

leaders and President Kennedy were aware, of course, that
the long~term existence of a pro-Soviet regime in Cuba
was intolerable.-^

The Soviet military build-up in Cuba

was a clear "challenge to United States*
Western Hemisphere„”3^

hegimony in the

On April 17, 19£Bf the invasion

party began its assault on Cuba in a small inlet which
became known as the Bay of Pigs (Giron);.

Three days later

the invasion was over; it had been totally defeated.
Theodore Draper, author of Castro*s Revolution,
has characterized it splendidly when he w r o t e ”

’’The

32Berle, cp>. cit., p. 47„
33This is well documented in both Haynes Johnson,
The Bay of P i g s , o p . c i t ., and Tad Szule and Karl E.
Meyer, The Cuban Invasion:- The Chronicle of a Disaster
(Mew York:
Praeger, 1962). —
’
34Suarez, ££.

c it., see ’’foreword.”
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ill-fated invasion of Cuba was one of those rare politicomilitary events--a perfect failure."^ [^This particular
event was not only a disaster for the image of the U.S.,
\

but it was a personal failure for John F. Kennedy-’-a
failure of such magnitude that Pierre Salinger was
prompted to s a y " T h e

Bay of Pigs was J.F.K.’s first

major defeat as President and the greatest disaster of
his entire Administration."^6 Q^ith all the available
military power and influence to destroy the world,
John F c Kennedy did nothing as

„ . Fidel Castro glee

fully spouting communistic shibboleths, rounded up pri"3

7

soners from the beach.''^'

In commenting on Kennedy’s

handling of the Cuban affair, Arthur Krock wrote:
r—
|And, after the debacle of the Bay of Pigs expedi
tion that his half-in, half-out support had fore
ordained, he blamed it on incompetent counsel of
the military Chiefs of Staff. . . . Kennedy's
transfer of blame from himself to the Chiefs of
Staff for the Bay of Pigs disaster was leaked to
the press to preserve for him the reputation for
resolute leadership he had definitely failed to
demonstrate in this instance7\38
(italics mine.)
^ T h e o d o r e Draper, Castro’s Revolution:
and Realities (New York:
Praeger^ 1962).

Myths

36pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (1st ed.; Garden
City, N 0Y„: Doubleday, 1966), p. 149. See also Arthur M„
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days:
John F. Kennedy in the
White House (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965).
37sidey, ojd. cit., p. 124.
3$Arthur Krock, In the Nation:
1932-1966
(New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196$), pp. 321-25.
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Krock*s appraisal of Kennedy is interesting in light of
a very aggressive and decisively firm statement Kennedy
made in his book, Why England Slepti
I We cannot tell anyone to keep out of our
hemisphere unless our armaments and the people
behind those armaments are prepared to back up
the command, even to the ultimate point of going
to war. . o . If we debate, if we,question, if
we hesitate, it will be too late.3y
When the debating, questioning, and hesitating ended in
the Giron disaster, Herbert L. Matthews made a comment
entirely in character:

”Thank the Lord,” he wrote, ”for

the United States and Cuba that the invasion of April 17,
1961, failed!”^0
The reactions in the White House were from extreme
emotionalism to somber reflection.
Salinger:

Kennedy said to

”We really blew this o n e , " ^

His brother, the

Attorney General, is reported to have told the President
emotionally, ”They can't do this to you--those blackbearded Commies can't do this to you!”^2
(But they did, and nothing can alter the grim fact
that instead of overthrowing Castro the invasion further
39john F. Kennedy, Why England Slept (New York:
Wo Funk Inc., 1961).
^ H e r b e r t L. Matthews, as quoted in Lazo,
o p . ci t ., p. 299«
^Salinger,

op. c i t ., p. 148.

^ N a t i o n a l R e v i e w . May 2, 1967, p. 479«
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secured his hold on the country; that instead of pro
tecting the image of the country as President Kennedy had
stressed in keeping the operation covert and adhering to
a policy of "non-intervention/1 it had subjected the
country to worldwide scorn.

No one believed the persisi,o

yi

tent Peking claims that the U.S. was a "paper t i g e r ,
but everyone believed that it behaved like one.^
Jpresident Kennedy had made a d e c i s i o n ^ to support
the invasion.
matter.

Whether it was covert or overt does not

He had made a commitment to action.

party is an example of that tacit commitment.

The invasion
The Presi

dent had to choose between two courses of action suggested
by his advisors:

(1) to stage an invasion of Cuba with

military support if necessary, or (2) not to intervene.
In order to avoid the risks whic h either course of action
would have involved. President Kennedy attempted to take
the middle course, intervening just a little, but not
enough to assure s u c c e s s " Y e t

in foreign policy," as

Raymond Aron puts it, "the half-measure, the compromise
^3see "On Khrushchev4s Phoney Communism and Its
Historical Lessons for the World" (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1964)0
44For reference to term "’decision," see s u pr a,
p. 31» n. 26.
^^See Morgenthau, The Trouble with Kennedy,
o p . c i t ., p . 51.

92

ordinarily combines the disadvantages of the two possible
policies."
ground!

16

/ ~'v

yin foreign policy, there can be no middle

Whether Kennedy should or should not have approved

J

the invasion attempt is not at issue here.
him to decide.

That was for

He was President of the United States.

Only he could have made the d e c i s i o n - o n e wa y or the other.
(Having made an affirmative decision, Kennedy had to assure
victory and this he failed to d o .

He chose the gray; he

chose the compromise between "black and white" and this
ultimately was a "decision for d i s a s t e r T h e

President

had made a commitment and then failed to stand firm.
choices were clear;1 (1) to disband the invasion,

His

(2) post

pone it, (3) intervene militarily with overwhelming force,
or (4) support it just a little.
disaster.

He

His fourth choice was a

. . jeopardized the national interests

o f the United States by aiming at a short-run, short
lived, and ill-fated maneuver . „ .

to restore the

balance of p o w e r ^ in the Caribbean, instead of pursuing
^ R a y m o n d Aron, "An Open Letter to President
Kennedy," Le F i g a r o , September 30, 1961, as quoted in
Morgenthau, The Trouble wi t h K enne dy , o p . c i t ., p. $1.
^Lazo,

p p , c i t ., p. 379o

^Harjs J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American
Foreign Policy (Chicago;
University of Chicago Press,
1962), p . 14 o
^ T h e term "balance of power" is here used in its
classical sense of restoring the equilibrium in the Carib
bean which had been materially changed by the influx of
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a more realistic and viable policy through innovative
executive leadership»

The immediate calling off of the

invasion might have made some sense; its abandonment to
destruction made n o n e a

The Kennedy Administration had

been overly concerned with the effect which open involve
ment of American troops would have upon "world opinion
/The fact is that the U.S., abandonment of the invasion
force probably affected world opinion more adversely than
a successful invasion would have).
j

saidi

As Kennedy himself

"There is an old saying that victory has one

hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan."^®
^ K e n n e d y ' s behavior towards the invasion force
was inconsistent and vacillatory0

It was Kennedy himself

who called off the strategic air strikes that would have
demobilized Castro's infant air force; it was Kennedy's
refusal to permit a second Cuban air strike which "!put
the enterprise in irretrievable period.

. . <,” 51

A

tacit commitment had been made by supporting the invasion
plan and training its members„

But when the time came

Soviet armaments and military hardware to the area.
an excellent classical discussion of the term, see
Inis Lo Claude, Power and International Relations
(New York:
Random House, 1962).

For

-^John F „ Kennedy, as cited in Johnson, o p 0 cit e,
p. 176o
51 B l a c k s t o c k , ojd0 c i t . , p. 252.
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for action, the Kennedy Administration failed to respond„
President Kennedy’s decision to avoid further involve
ment by not allowing the two remaining air strikes was a
decision for disaster,.

The whole fiasco greatly diminished

both the prestige and the material power of the U „ S „
'X\
Kennedy's unwillingness to use force proved costly, as J
Henry Wriston has recorded;
(Total failure seriously damaged American pres
tige and impaired its influence in other sensitive
areas. „ „ „ The disaster enhanced the prestige of
Castro o The man who had bested the ’’Colossus of
the North” became a hero to many and was made to
appear a good deal larger than real life« <> ® 0
Moreover, failure impaired the standing of the
United States not only in t~his hemisphere, but
also with its major allies, j « „52
((in the Bay of Pigs episode, the U 0S „ had failed
to live up to its reputation for greatness),,

’’The United

S:tates is a power among powers,” writes Morgenthau,
\J”fatefully involved in the affairs of the globe where
'A
prestige is an indispensable ingredient of p o w e r ^ , ^
(The risks involved in not fulfilling a commitment or
honoring one's words is that the enemy may be tempted to
put that reputation to the test-^

President Kennedy's

dilemma was that a full-scale invasion might be held

5^Henry Wriston, ”A Historical Perspective,"
in Plank, Cuba and The United S t a t e s , o p „ c i t », p„ 34®
53Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign
Policy, op, c i t ,,, p 0 4&o

*
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comparable to Russia's conduct in Hungary and would shock
the world's leaders beyond redress.

President Kennedy

had failed to heed the historic axiom concerning the use
of military power and force:;

"In starting or making a

war, not the right is what matters, but victory
Kennedy chose,

instead of victory, a middle course--

intervention without adequate air cover--which was carried
out with "amateurish i n e p t n e s s . T h a t
in favor of a compromise was " . . .
of resolution."56

Kennedy decided

due in part to a want

President Kennedy may have very well

read Neustadt’s book on Presidential P o w e r , with its
emphasis on personal power and its politics, but his b e 
havior in the Bay of Pigs affair certainly did not show
i t H i s

decisions markedly dissipated his personal power

and reputation.)

Shortly after the crisis the President

asked himself aloud:
base.

"How could I have been so far off

All my life I've known better than to depend on

the experts.

How could I have been so stupid, to let them

57
go ahead?"''

His anguish was surely deepened by the fact

^ A d o l f Hitler, as quoted in Blackstock, op. ci t. ,
p. 2 5 3 .
55Lerner, op. cit. , p. 93«
cA
' C h a r l e s J. Murphy, "Khrushchev’s Paper Bear,"
Fortune, LII (December 1964), 230.
57sorensen, K e n n e d y , o p . cit., p. 309«
President
Kennedy was quite emotionally upset over this disaster,
as Sorensen relates.
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that the rest of the world, and particularly the Soviet
Union, was asking the same quest ion , (^After the Bay of
Pigs fiasco, Kennedy decided that the deadliest sin was

to be irresolute 5 8
(^In the American support for the Bay of Pigs in
vasion, the Kennedy Administration would have liked to
have had a new regime which was both non-Communist and
not aligned with the Soviet Union^ It would undoubtedly
•o
be useful if the foreign policy-makers would put a pri
ority on these goals, but there is no evidence that such
a priority existed in the Kennedy Administration ,

In

stead, it attempted to accomplish with covert or clandes
tine means that which it was unwilling to attempt with
59
diplomacy or direct military actio n,

As Max Beloff

describes it, President Kennedy was pursuing a policy of
"limited liability"

in the Cuban invasion,.

The image

^ This particular change in President Kennedy’s
attitudes toward foreign policy is particularly well
analyzed by Ian McMahan, "The Kennedy Myth," New
Politics, III, No. 1 (1963-64)5 41-48,
59see Lyman B „ Kirkpatrick, J r „ , The Beal C.I. A .
(New York:
MacMillan and Co,, i960 ), pp„ l84-87ff°
^ L i m i t e d liability is a policy in which there is
little reason to intervene in a situation where the like
lihood of success is marginal and the penalties for
failure fall on o n e ’s self.
The Bay of Pigs fiasco is the
best example of this.
See Max Beloff, "Reflections on
Intervention," Journal of International A f f a i r s , XXII
(1968), 202-12; also Adam Yarmolinsky, "American Foreign
Policy and the Decision to Intervene," Journal of Inter
national A f f a i r s , XXII (1968), 231,

of sober common sense and resolute action that President
Kennedy had projected to the world during his vigorous
campaign and early presidential statements was failing t
materialize„ \President Kennedy's irresolution caused
n o 0 o one of the most grievous diplomatic blunders in
American hi story 0,? 1

To a man who had promised to get

the country moving again, the Cuban affair was a humili
ating, personal failures.

The repercussion revived cam-

paxgn allegations that Kennedy was immature and illprepared to guide the nation in international affairs,
/"but the real significance of the disaster, as Thomas
Freeman has written, was not so much that Cuba was lost,
but that the U „S » was unwilling to use its power to
defend and control a vital national interest 2
At the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, United States
diplomatic and military policy failed*, But the
real significance of the failure was not in American
relations with Guba„
Cuba was already lost, and the
Bay of Pigs only recorded the facto
The real sig
nificance of the Bay of Pigs, which the United
States Government was slow to realize, was.that to
the Russian regime and all Latin America it showed
a disastrous paralysis of w i l l -in short weak ne ss » o
0
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After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States
Government was cautious <,■■■„ „ it seemed less sure
of itself and, worgt^ of all, impotent to handle the
gnat sting of Cubac.6^
(Italics mine*,)

^ L a s k y , op<= c i t „ , p„ 4 ? 6 0

Conn*, ?

^ T h o m a s Freeman, The Crisis in Cuba (Derby,
Monarch Books I n c . , 1 963 ) s 'P» 1 23«
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Cfhe failure of the U.Si to act decisively at this
juncture created a vacuum which the Soviets were more
than willing to fill.
And to make things worse, in the orgy of national
self-recrimination that followed the Bay of Pigs invasion.
President Kennedy took the full blame .j Thus, like Presi
dent Eisenhower in the U-2 operation, our chief of state
acknowledged complicity in an activity about which he
should have remained sil e nt .

In espionage and other covert

operations, there are certain standards of conduct and
operative principles which have developed out of long
experience.

One of the most elementary of these is that

when a covert operation has been seriously exposed, it is
disavowed and dropped.^

This is done not so much for the

appearance of being tough, but as a matter of realistic
politics .
It permits the normal conduct of international
relations to continue without the constant dis
ruptions that would occur if every apprehended
agent were acknowledged.64
f The damage done, Kennedy accepted sole responsi
bility for the events.

A great power had in fact ad

mitted that it had n . . . violated the spirit and probably
the letter of international agreements into which it had

6>33ee Blackstock, o p . c i t ., pp. 241“60 for a
thorough discussion of diplomatic behavior in such events.
64 k irkpatrick, rg. c i t . , p. 201.
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freely entered;

it had winked at the violation of its own

neutrality laws*}^'’ "There is one absolute requirement,"
writes Arthur Plank, "for intervention by a great power
in a small nation:

it must be done skillfully enough and

on a large enough scale to guarantee its success."^6
This requirement was violated by the Kennedy Administration*
When one looks back upon the invasion and the
politics that surrounded the decision, the dilemma of
American policy toward Latin America becomes increasingly
clear:

0*The Bay of Pigs was a public confession by the

United States that it had failed to understand or deal
with the most significant political change in the hemi
sphere in fifty years *""^7
Our ignorance of the Cuban situation was merely a
particular instance of our long-standing national disin
terest in and lack of knowledge of Latin America as a
whole*

Our policies have been "ethnically and culturally

arrogant*"uo
tragedy

69

Cuba, in particular, is an American

because Cuba has always been the area of

65piank, o p * cit * , p„ 33°
66Ibid*
^ L a F e b e r , _op* c i t ., p* 223°
6$Bayless Manning, "An Overall Perspective,"' in
Plank, o p * cit * , p* 225*
69zeitlin, o p * cit* , p* 207°
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primary interest to'the U.S. in Latin America (i.e., a
traditional and geographical core interest of the U.S.).
Kennedy had learned many things about the use of
military power--or rather, he learned what happens in
the absence of it.

He learned about the resiliency of

the Communist enemy and about inaction and irresolution.
But the occasion was still bitter defeat.

f

vThe prestige of the United States, already danger
ously eroded around the globe, suffered more, and
more important than any of these was the danger
that Nikita Khrushchev might look at the wreckage
on the beach and decide that the President of the
United States could be pushed to virtually any
limit.
A war of miscalculation could easily arise
from such co nc l u s i o n s T v . .70
Several days after the disaster, Kennedy addressed
the problem of Cuba, giving a stern and authoritarian
statement concerning our core interestsr
Any unilateral American intervention in the
absence of an external attack upon ourselves or
an ally would have been contrary to our inter
national obligations.
But let the record show
that our restraint is not inexhaustible„
Should it ever appear that the inter-American
doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or
excuses a policy of non-action; if the nations of
this hemisphere should fail to meet their commit
ments against outside Communist penetration, then I
want it clearly understood this government will not
hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which
are the security of our nation.
We intend to
profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine

7 ^Sidey, op. cit ., p. 123. For an analysis of
Soviet foreign policy toward Cuba during these events,
see Herbert Dinerstein, "Soviet Foreign Policy in L . A . ,"
o p . c i t ., pp. S0“S4«
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and reorient our forces of all kinds . . . disappoint
ments will often accompany us, „ . .
Let me then make clear as the President of the
United States that I am determined upon our system’s
survival and success, regardless of the cost and
regardless of the p e r i l ,,71
(Italics m i n e .)
These were typical Kennedy words,.

Would there be action?

This was the question? would there be the determination
that would win the next one?
From this statement two things emerge.

As of

April 20, 1961, Cuba was definitely a geographical core
interest.

Also, as of that date there was still an ideo

logical U.S. interest in Cuba expressed in Kennedy’s
reference to opposing Communist penetration in this hemi
sphere „

But unless the leaders of the U „ S „ were willing

to take positive measures (e„g„, invasion) to assert that
ideological interest, it can no longer be properly considered as a core interest in its own right or an element
of a geographical core interest.

Throughout the following

year, policy statements made by the Administration suggest
that the national leaders would not invade Cuba to oust
Communism,,

The Kennedy Administration did, however, take

a number of aggressive actions— constituting an economic
boycott— which were designed to bring the downfall of the
Castro regim e.

Thus, the U.S. position during this period

was ambiguous J

The Administration did not admit final

7^ New York T i m e s . April 21, 19 61, p. 1
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(loss of Cuba, although it did take several measures to
redress the setbacks

But it stopped short of taking the

kind of action (military) which would have been necessary
at that point to bring about the desired result,\
— ■"

Laos: The Travesty of
N eutralization
<\ T h e international political situation in Laos
reached serious or crisis proportions during the close of
the Eisenhower and the beginning of the Kennedy Administra
tions o

There had been strong pressures for American mili

tary intervention in Laos and Eisenhower told Kennedy the
day before the Inauguration,
there and fight it out,ff72

T,You might have to go in
By the end of May, these

pressures had reached their peak*

But President Kennedy

in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco had become more
\,N.

skeptical of military advice and military solutions'*,

He

had requested position papers of the prospects for Ameri
can military intervention in Laos from each of the Joint
Chiefso (The Chiefs* basic premise was simply for the U 0S«
to go all out for a military victory or get out of Laos*
President Kennedy found both proposals unacceptable.

He

once again chose the middle ground— neutralization#!
Throughout April 1961, attempts to arrange a

^ T h e o d o r e Sorensen, The Kennedy L e g a c y , o p , c i t ,,
p o 1S3 o
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cease fire with the guerrilla fighters and the Pathet Lao
had failed. (On April 24, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
joined Great Britain in an appeal for a cease fire and a
fourteen-nation conference to begin in Geneva on May 1 2 .
The appeal was effective, and after months of wrangling,
agreement was reached on December 18 on a declaration
reaffirming the sovereignty and neutrality o f ■Laos and on
the supervised withdrawal of all foreign troops. ;
.jThe position of the U.S. government, and partieularly President Kennedy, is quite baffling.*^
'‘Going back to President Kennedy’s press conference
speech on Laos on March 23, 1961, he stated that the U.S.
strongly and unreservedly supported the goal of a neutral
\

and independent Lao^, tied to no outside power or group of
powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination.
Kennedy went on to state that if present Communist hos
tilities and attacks did not stop those who supported a
genuinely neutral Laos would have to consider their
response.^

”No one should doubt our own resolution on

this point,” Kennedy said.

”We are faced with a clear

threat of a change in the internationally agreed position
of Laos.-75 (in essence, Kennedy threatened to take
^ B la c k s t o c k , op. c i t », p. 199.
7^S:ee Kennedy, To Turn the T i d e , o p . cit,,
pp. 33-41* »
^ I b i d . , pp. 39-40.
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action if hostilities did not cease and
a o o appealed to the Soviet Union to respect
the neutralism of Laos and warned that the
Western Powers cannot permit Laos, which is geo
graphically a perfect buffer state between the
two great coalitions, to_be taken over by Com
munists or pro-Communistsi 76
^Kennedy had called for a neutral Laos in hopes that the
Communists would call off their offensive and would agree
to let the country have peace.\ "His answer was the whine,
of Communist bullets

As Henry Kissinger has remarked,

(^Kennedy's professed willingness to defend Laos was in
consistent with his policy of n e u t r a l i za ti on ." ^ / Kennedy
had demanded a cease fire in Laos, but he failed to back
up his strong words uttered at the press conference on
March 23, 1961.

He cheapened what he said, and it cast

doubt on his credibility.

It was a well-known fact at

that time that the Communists were increasing their guer
rilla efforts in Lao^j.

"In 1961 and 1962, the Soviet

Union (and possibly China) threw large amounts of arms and
equipment into Laos, while North Vietnam supplied the
Pathet Lao with troops, instructors, and advisors
^ F r e d e r i c k L. Schuman, The Cold War; Retrospect
and Prospect (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University
Press, 1962), p. 95°
77Sidey,

o£. c it., p. 75°

A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy
Norton, 1969), p° 33°

7$Henry

(New York:

79J. Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire:
A,
Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York:
Praeger, 1964),
p. 2o S .
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C._In his speech, Kennedy had warned that a Commu
nist takeover would "quite obviously affect the security
of the United States."
prepared for a fight.

He had warned Khrushchev to be
Several days later, Andrei Gromyko,

the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited' the White House.
Kennedy warned Gromyko against pushing the U.S. too far
in a situation where its prestige was at stake.

President

Kennedy informed Gromyko that the U . S . did not intend to
stand idly by while the Communists took over Laos.
Gromyko made it clear that the Soviet Union shared the
U.S.'s desire for an independent and neutral Laos and ex
pressed hope that an agreement could be reached),
( I n the process of these meetings, Kennedy had
downgraded his position from will fight, to may fight,
to will not fight for Laos.

His policy went from firm

commitment to open accommodation.

"Kennedy’s tough words,

spoken as Laos was being swallowed by the Communists,
proved to have no impression on K h r u s h c h e v . K e n n e d y
argued finally that Laos was not worth a,fight, and he
sought to alleviate the situation by neutralizing a
country in which the U.S. had spent more than three million

ouJohn F. Kennedy, as quoted in Lasky, 0£. c i t .,
p. 563.
See Lasky, o£. c i t ., pp. 563-69.
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dollars in "anti-Communism" programs.

$2

Thus, in less

than four months— between January 1961 and May 1961-™
President Kennedy's policies in Laos had run the gamut
from the Duliesian concept of Laos as a "bastion of the
free world”^

to the hope that Laos would remain an

effective neutralized zone.

Bernard Fall goes on to say

that the U.S. accepted one by one every aspect of neutralization in Laos which it had fought against so tenaciously
since 1957A

The U.S. position was also seriously weakened

by the inability of SEATO to deal with the political
problem in Laos. ^(^The U.S. was unable to present a uni
fied strategy to deal with the problem.""".
That Kennedy was pursuing a policy of accommodation
$2Francis B. Stevens, ”When Kennedy Faces
Khrushchev,” U.S. N e w s , L (May 29, 1961), 40.
For an
account of U.S. financial involvement in Laos, see Keyes
Beech, "How Uncle Sam Fumbled in Laos," Saturday Evening
P o s t , CCXXXIV (April 22, 1961).
^ B e r n a r d Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," Current
His to ry , XLII (January 1962), 11. Gerald Hickey and
Adrienne Suddard, in "Laos:
Pawn in Power Politics,"
Current History, XLI (December 1961), especially
pp. 353-35» present a similar argument as does Fall.
They
see neutralization as just another word for Communist
takeover, followed by the retreat of the West.

^ T h i s problem was exacerbated by the fact that
the British and French would not support American strategy
in Laos.
Diplomats freely admitted that joint Western
strategy for the neutralization of Laos was confused and
uncertain of its objectives.
See Edmund Clubb, "The
Lesson of Laos,” Progressive, XXV (May 1961), 5-6; also
”Geneva--0ne More Setback for the United States,"
U.S. News, L (May 29, 1961), 41-42.
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and appeasement in Laos is undeniable. \ The U.S. had failed
'V...

in an expensive attempt to mold the situation in Laos to
its purpose;

consequently, Kennedy ” , . » decided not only

to neutralize Laos but also to win Russian backing for this
plan.”,_j7

Kennedy had assumed that the Communists could

persuaded that further military actions in Laos were
unnecessary and provocative.
thinking was that ” . . .

Kenn ed y’s mistake in such

areas that are in contention,

like Laos, cannot be effectively ’neutralized’ without
fairly active American intervention and a credible mili
tary presence

in the background to maintain the local
. -

balance of power.”

■*

^

[ Kennedy had made a choice--neutral-

ization rather than confrontation--and he accepted the
logical imperative:

"The Communists would have to be

granted substantive concessions.”^?

Kennedy wanted a

political rather than a military solution.

\
I

I
j
(

The U.S. posi?-

tion was ambiguous because while disengaging from Laos,
the Kennedy Administration was busy trying to strengthen
the Saigon g o v e r n m en t^

I The neutralization of Laos was a major victory
V,

\
for the Communists^

Premier Khrushchev’s willingness to

,t
-V\
r1

^ K e n n e t h L. Hill, "President Kennedy and the
Neutralization of Laos,” Review of Politics, XXX
(July 1969), 354=
66Robert F„ Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) , p. 22*1
S7H ill, o p . c i t ., p. 354.
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neutralize Laos did not mean that he opposed the extension of Communism in Southeast Asia.00

The neutrality

and coalition government agreement were not inconsistent
with his philosophy of nwars of national liberation.n
/[That Kennedy should believe that Khrushchev could be
persuaded to use his influence on the Pathet Lao to make
them desist the aggressive acts is nothing but sheer
political naivete and diplomatic ineptness.

President

K ennedy’s actions conveyed to the Communists that he was
deferring rather than excluding a military response.

He

wanted a way out of the situation and the Communists were

<

more than willing to go along with him.

"The Communists

could legitimately claim that the 1961 Geneva agreement
was a major victory for them and a major defeat for the
United States.”

39

Kennedy had repeatedly warned the

Communists through threats of military action against
using military force in Laos.

However, Kennedy’s own

actions made his own warnings and threats incredible.
These warnings were ignored by the Communists; military
force was employed, and they won a political victory.
President Kennedy’s policy in Laos brings to mind an old
6^Cf., Philip E. Mosely, "The Kremlin and the Third
World,tT Foreign Af f a i r s , XLVI (October 1967)®
Here the
author discusses the Kremlin’s foreign policy toward the
Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America.
The dif
ferences in policies are evident.
^Hill,

o p . c i t ., p . 364=
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sayingr

"The road of appeasement is not the road to

peace, but is surrender on the installment plan,!’
/

—

l.The effect that Kennedy’s neutralization policy
had on our credibility posture is that it weakened it
substantially^

As Thomas Schelling indicates, President

Kennedy’s policies toward Laos were "casuistieally"
oriented:
If one reaches the point where concession is
advisable, he has to recognize two effects:- it
puts him closer ,to his opponent’s position, and it
affects his opponent’s estimate of his firmness,,
Concession not only may be construed as capitu
lation, it may mark a prior commitment as a fraud
and make the adversary skeptical of any new pre
tense at commitment090
--

;The fact is that Laos is not now neutral,* nor was it in
1961.

In the words of Tran Van Binh, Charge d ’Affaires

and Acting Ambassador of Vietnam to the United States in
1964, "Laos neutrality is a fa9ade„"91
While Laos was being neutralized at the bargaining
table, the Pathet Lao marched on.
Administration did nothing,,

And the Kennedy

U.S. resolve had faltered

once again.

9^For an explanatory discussion of casuistry in
foreign policy, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of
Conflict» o p o cit 0 , p„ 34.
9 “lTran Van Dinh, "The Fiction of Neutrality in
Laos," New R e p ub li c, CLVIII (February 24, 196S)', 45.
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Vienna? A Soviet Probe of
American Resolve
(John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev met in
Vienna June 3 and 4, 1961“-the only face-to-face confronta
tion they were to have as heads of state.

It was to be a

sober two days as President Kennedy mentioned some time
later.

The Bay of Pigs disaster only six weeks earlier

and the U.S. disengagement from Laos had brought American
prestige to its lowest point since the Francis Gary Powers
U-2 incident in May 1960.

92

Khrushchev, sensing the time

was right to force important American concessions on the
German question, came to Vienna not to negotiate but to
dictate to the young American President.

And that he

did.^ |
<

^

President Kennedy was anxious to meet Premier
Khrushchev.

He was going to Vienna to size up Khrushchev

and to establish a personal, relationship that might be
useful later.

As Theodore Sorensen relates the facts,

Kennedy wanted to look at Khrushchev, hear him talk,
listen to his words, and watch him as he sat across the
table.

One meeting was worth more than all the diplo

matic messages.

("If the Soviet Premier had the idea that

Kennedy’s actions in Laos and Cuba indicated weakness, he
92S:alinger, ojc. c i t ., pp. 175-158.
93ibi d ., p. 175„

/■
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thought that a face-to-face meeting would dispel that
impression."^

Kennedy hoped that a meeting would disabuse

any misapprehensions Khrushchev may have had concerning
Kennedy's recklessness or weakness of will.(j,
Khrushchev was a formidable opponent,,

Kennedy was

up against a leader who placed only a propaganda value on
words.

When dealing with Khrushchev, the opponent had to

realize that "action is the one and only language respected

c

by the Soviet dictator of the Communist empire."^5 vSo
far, Kennedy's "action record" was sorrowfully lacking,
Cuba, Laos, and the failure of the nuclear test ban
treaty had been humiliating setbacks for the U.S.

The

images Khrushchev had perceived of these events were
extremely important.

For images in the interplay of

international politics are the real world,

Kennedy was

aware of the fact that he must convince Khrushchev that
the U.S. would go to the "brink" if necessary to defend
its commitments.

(And as Llewellyn Thompson had told

Kennedy, much of Soviet policy was based on Khrushchev's
personal estimate of government h e a ds .s
Kennedy had made a misjudgment at the Bay of Pigs.
Khrushchev had to make many judgments about the West.
The whole purpose of the meeting was to bring precision

9^-Sidey,

q jd .

^Stevens,

c i t . , p. 1 6 3.

op, cit. , p. 40.
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into those judgments.
was ever obtained„
was not

It is doubtful whether precision

Subsequent events indicate that it

(i.e., Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis).

jrhe discussions at Vienna revolved around three
main topics:

(1) Berlin,

(2) Cuba, and (3) Laos.

'Of

great interest are Kennedy's responses to Khrushchev's
belligerent and provocative statements.

If it was

Kennedy's purpose to show Khrushchev that the U.S. was
determined and not lacking in will or resolution, his
behavior did not impart that image\

Kennedy had tried,

as always, to be "4 . . rational and calm with Khrushchev
to get him to define what the Soviet Union could and
would d o . \Khrushchev bullied Kennedy and threatened
him with war over Berlin.

While Kennedy talked of

securing peace for all the world, Khrushchev was threaten
ing to cut off Western access rights in Berlin],
Khrushchev's early discussions included a reaffirmation
of the inevitability of the Communist revolution and
"wars of national liberation."

In effect, he candidly

told Kennedy that Communist frontal attacks on "capitalist"
positions were ineffective and that he was banking on the
indirect approach, the coexistence policy which had

96<Jam es Reston, "What Was Killed Was Not Only
the President, But a Promise," New York Times M a g a z i n e ,
November 15? 1964? p. 126.

113
already brought results in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.97
Kennedy retorted by expressing the view that Communism
was undemocratic and this country wanted the nations of
the third world to determine their own destiny, free of
outside intervention.
matter of Cuba.

Khrushchev then brought up the

Khrushchev stated that the U.S. was

largely responsible for the proliferation of Communism.
Fidel Castro, he said, was being forced into the Marxist
camp because U.S. economic sanctions had left him nowhere else to go.

( Kennedy passively disagreed, stating that the
U.S. had taken action against Castro because he was sub™
verting the island into a Communist base that was a
direct threat to democratic governments in Latin America.
Cuba alone was not regarded as a threat.9^

"Would

Khrushchev stand idly by if a pro-American government
were to come to power in Poland and begin subverting its
Communist bloc neighbors to capitalism?”

99

Of course n o t y

!

r~

I That Kennedy had not destroyed Castro when he had
\
the chance was somewhat baffling and confusing to Khrush
chev^

The fact is that the Russians would have

9?For documentation of these talks, see J. Librach,
chapter entitled "Summit Diplomacy,” ojs. cit. , pp. 230-50.
-9?Sne Sorensen, Kenne dy , o p . ci t., p. 547.
99Salinger, o£„ c i t ., p. 179.
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. . wiped out a similar threat in a matter of
h o u r s , a n d

Khrushchev found it hard to understand
•""X

why Kennedy had not done so.

Kennedy’s infirmity of pur

pose was evident to Khrushchev.

Kennedy’s action in

handling the Cuban case revealed to Khrushchev
”. . .

little evidence of willingness to recognize the

developing danger and to move resolutely to cope with

\The important thing, Kennedy stated, was that the
two super powers avoid miscalculations that might lead to
nuclear war.

He stressed peaceful competition, disarma

ment, and continued efforts to open up channels of
accommodation.^Khrushchev was unsympathetic and unbending.
K e n ne dy ’s pleas were met with more threats and belliger
ence^) Kennedy’s central thesis of the entire meeting was
to convince Khrushchev that the two great nuclear powers
must avoid situations whi ch commit their vital interests
in a direct confrontation from which neither could back

"I00A very perceptive analysis of Soviet-Guban
foreign policy is presented in Lazo, Dagger in the H e a r t ,
o p . c ito Lazo is of the opinion that President Kenne d y’s
Cuban policies encouraged Soviet penetration of the
Caribbean.
I can hardly disagree.
101oie H. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, and Robert G.
North, "Measuring the Effect and Action in International
Reaction Mode ls t Empirical Materials from the 1962
Cuban Crisis,n in James N„ Rosenau, International Poli
ties and Foreign Affairs (New York:
Free Press, 1969)9
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down.
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When Kennedy talked with Khrushchev of the

tragedy of killing millions of people in both countries
in a matter of minutes should either nation misjudge the
other, Kennedy said that therefore, perhaps, both men should
soften a little in their positions,,
moved*)

Khrushchev was un

He admitted the disaster of nuclear war, but he

did not admit that concessions were a way to avoid it.
They talked about the possibilities of general disarma
ment and negotiation, but no viable solution was found.
Kennedy stated that his one ambition was to secure peace,
and he hoped that the meeting was a step in that direction. }
vThe most heated discussions concerned Berlin.
Khrushchev threatened that the Berlin situation could no
longer be postponed and he would sign a separate peace
treaty with East Germany in.December 1961.

The treaty

would recognize no continuing American rights in West
Berlin.

Khrushchev was militant about the necessity of

eliminating Western power in West Berlin.

Kennedy

answered that the West was in Berlin legally and would
use force to maintain its rights there "at any r i s k .")
Kennedy reiterated his warnings to Khrushchev not to mis
calculate American intentions.
.
1 02

(His stand was clear:
V

For a detailed account of conversations be
tween the two leaders, see S or en se n , Kenn ed y, o p . c i t .,
pp. 543-6 4 6 ; Sidey, ojc. c i t ., pp. 192-201; Lasky, op. ci t.,
pp. 56G-574; and Salinger, o£. ci t., pp. 133-196.
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\The threat to the brave city of Berlin remains.,
In these last six months the Allies have made it
unmistakedly clear that our presence in Berlin, our
free access thereto and the freedom of the two
million West Berliners would not be surrendered
either to force or through appeasements, that to
maintain those rights and obligations, we are pre
pared to talk, when appropriate, and to fight if
necessaryo103
Worried about the effects of the Bay of Pigs and
the Laos settlement upon American credibility, and dis
turbed at public reports that Khrushchev had browbeaten
him at Vienna, Kennedy prepared himself for the showdown
in Berlin which he* once described as the ’’touchstone of
American honor and r e s o l v e T h e
will” ^ ^

’’test of nerve and

that Kennedy had once spoken of was not long in

coming!
)For Kennedy, the Vienna meeting with Khrushchev

v,,.,.-

had been a traumatic expedience»

Khrushchev’s belligerent

attitude and unyielding behavior was confirmed„

It was

indeed going to be a ’’long, cold winter^”
\Had Kennedy been firm and forceful in dealing
with Khrushchev?

Did Kennedy convince Khrushchev of his

determination and resolve?

Would the U»S 0 use the force

Kennedy had pledged if Berlin access rights were violated?
The Berlin Wall speaks for itself ?)
^ K e n n e d y , The Strategy of P ea c e , o p 0 c i t „, p„ 16„
"*04see Sorensen, Kennedy, _opQ c i t ., pp„ 5S3-5S60

,i
^
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The Berlin Wall:
A Contingency Plan
That Did Mot Exist
'^’’Influenced by his reading of President Kennedy’s
susceptibilities, and by the weakening of the American
position as a result of the Bay of Pigs disaster,

r^Khrushchev reopened the Berlin crisis in the summer of
1961

At Vienna, Kennedy had made it clear that the

UoS’o would stand firm in Ber li n<>
mitments o

It would meet its com

In his Berlin statements of June 6, July 19,

and'July 25, 1961, Kennedy had reaffirmed American resolve
and determination to honor its commitments "at any risk.-**
Nevertheless, Khrushchev was anxious to test the serious
ness of Kennedy’s statements with regard to Berlin,,
Khrushchev’s peace treaty ultimatum of June 4, 1961, in
Vienna was designed to test the mettle of Kennedy,

The

new Berlin crisis that Khrushchev had manufactured posed
for the U.S. "the viability of collective security and of
NATO and the balance of power in Western E u r o p e »
fKhrushchev’s peace treaty declaration shrewdly

105Marshall D „ Shulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign
Policy*" Journal of International Affairs, XXII, No„ 1
(1963)
2W„
~ ~
^66fyja i£
R 0stow, "Conference Address," in.David
Abshire and Robert Allen, National Secur it y, o p ,, ci t0 ,
p. 420o
For an analysis of Khrushchev’s policies toward
Berlin, see Stefan T„ Possony, Analysis of the Khrushchev
Speech of January 6, 1961, UoSU Senate, Internal Security
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, £7th
Congo, 1st Sesso, 1961, p 0 7«

placed on the U.S:. the burden of initiating the use of
force.,

"The Soviets merely had made the d e m a n d s . I t

was the U.S. that had to decide whether to stand firm in
enforcing its legal and putative rights in Berlin or to
allow them to be violated.

Standing firm in Berlin re

quired at all times the possibility of using force to
back up Western rights
Throughout the summer of 1961, several harsh
statements were made by Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding
their respective positions.

The attention of Kennedy and

the Western allies at this time was concentrated largely
on negotiating an agreed position.

There was no official

reaction to Khrushchev’s June 4 aide memoire note until
July 17, 1 961 . V,,,Some observers concluded that "Premier
Khrushchev,

looking at Western effectives [military and

political] had good reason to doubt the W e s t ’s resolution to stand firm in Berlin or elsewhere."

1 ns

The U.S.

and the Western allies could not come to a generally
agreed position.^
C The U.S. commitment in the face of the Soviet
challenge was further weakened by the fact that the
Kennedy Administration " . . .
*^ S p a n i e r ,

wished to concentrate

o p . c i t ., p. 230.

^ ^" Re fl e c t i o n s on the Quarter," O rb i s .
Summer 1961, p. 126.
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decisions on access and administration of Berlin in the
White House, and thus deprive the commanders on the spot
of the initiative to act immediately in a time of emer
gency

3^
/
/
\When Moscow heard of President Kennedy®s strategy

in limiting the commanders in the field to act on initia
tive, Ambassador Menshikov is quoted as saying at a diplo
matic reception on July 14 in Washington:

T,In the final

analysis, when the chips are down, the American people
won't fight for Berlin.” "®^

Kennedy's reply to the Soviet

note of June 4> when it was finally delivered, had a firm
tone and yielded nothing*

President Kennedy went on to

say that "with regard to Berlin the United States

, . , is

insisting on and will defend its legal rights against any
unilateral abrogation*

* «

The Kennedy Administration had made its commitment*
It would not yield; it would protect its rights in B e r li n *)
Upon examining Kennedy's July 25 statement^^ on
f
"*09Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Robert Dickson Crane,
Detente; Cold War Strategies in Transition, o p , cit.,
p* 13 1j article entitled ”Berlin--Barometer of Tension,n
110U*S* News & World R e p o r t , July 13, 1961, p. 20,
" ^ U , S „ , Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, £7th Cong,,
1st S e s s , , December 1961, p, 681,
H ^ " R e p o r t to the Nation on Berlin Crisis,”
broadcast from the White House, July 25, 1961,
(See
s u p r a , p p 0 6.7-63,)
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the Berlin crisis, several contradictory and ambiguous
statements are apparent that brought doubt to the
Administration’s willingness to defend its interests.
As Professor Jean Edward Smith notes, K e n n e d y ’s July 25
speech states that though calling for money for defense,
his pledge of a ’’diplomatic offensive to reduce the
crisis” sounded like an appeal for disengagement and he
adds that Kennedy once more ’’began to waiver before the
I 1 O

threat of nuclear war.”

J

There were even reports that

Secretary Rusk was willing to offer certain concessions
1 1*
in return for proper guarantees of Western rights.
^
On August 7, 1961, Khrushchev delivered his most
belligerent speech.

In effect, he gave a warning to the

U.S'. not to interfere with a possible closing of the
border.
Nineteen days after Kennedy’s Berlin speech, the
Communists gave their reply. ( They began to erect the
wall that slashed Berlin--”the great testing place of our
courage and will ,” according to Kennedy--in hallj.

Once

again Kennedy was caught off b a l a n c e ^ He acted surprised,
and complained bitterly, ”No one had even warned him
^ 3 j ean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin
(Baltimore:
n.p., 1963), pp. 234-50.
I^S'ee Dulles and Crane, ojd . c i t . , p. 132.
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that such a dreadful thing could happen,^"* 5
/^But it did happen and the U,S« did nothing.

In

factj it took two days before the Western powers could
agree on a statement of protest.

The Berlin Wall had

left the U.S. without a policy.
The response from the West was silence.
In the
first hours no one had any advice.
John Kennedy
and his government had no plan of action for such
an eve nt , despite the sheaves of emergency measures
dreamed up for every other crisis,
Kennedy stated that the wall was illegal, immoral, and
inhumane.

Where was the decisive firmness and determi

nation to protect Western rights in Berlin of which
Kennedy had so eloquently spokent The construction of
x..y
the wall shocked the free world,
According to Robert
Strausz-Hupe, the violation of American access rights
was evident;
East Berlin has been sealed off, and thus
Inter-Allied agreement on Berlin has b_een breached
unilaterally by the Communists, . . .(jLot the
position of the Communists in East Berlin but the
access rights to West Berlin of the Western jLOLlies
became the subject of East-West negotiations^,!"* 7
^United States inaction in confronting the Soviet
challenge produced a deep shock and undermined the confi
dence

in the U.S.'s ability or even willingness to defend
11 ^Lasky,

ojd .

c i t . , p. 573<>

^"^Sidey, oj3. c i t . , p. 234,
^ ^ R o b e r t Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Strategy," in
Abshire and Allen, ojc, c i t ,, p. 11,

122

Western rights and interests*

U.S. credibility was

greatly weakened by its unwillingness to respond to a
blatant test of American resolver,/
Allied deeds have not measured up to allied words
and Berliners know it as well as the Russians.
President Kennedy said the U.S. would fight to
protect access routes.
But since the erection of
the wall the Communists have repeatedly held up
trains and trucks and they have reduced the number
of existing rail points on the West Berlin per
iphery from five to one.1 °
(,The trepidation of President Kennedy and the State
Department over Berlin and their refusal to maintain
Western rights greatly damaged the credibility of deter
rence strategy.

Again, as in the Bay of Pigs and Laos,

there was irresolution, conflicting opinion among the
President’s advisors, embarrassing publicity, and humili
ation. ^ 9

rphe U.S. response to Soviet blackmail tactics

was non-existentI

The Berlin Wall not only eroded the

U.S. position in Berlin, but also defined Western rights
on a descending scale.

1 20

Lin Berlin it was quite obvious that the U.S. had
11 ’David Binder, o p . cit ., pp. 20-21
^ ^ g ’eej for example, the discussion by Carl G.
Anthon, "The Berlin Crisis and Atlantic Unity," Current
XLII (January 1962), 22-24.
120jror a detailed analysis of erosion of Western
_______ i B B e r l i n , see Daniel Schorr, "The Trojan Troika
in Berlin," The Re p o r t e r . September 27, 1962, pp. 25-27;
also John Spanier, ojd . c i t . , pp. 230-240.
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failed to impress the Kremlin with its determination to
honor its commitments^

Although the Kennedy Administra-

tion had stated it would react sharply to affirm its
position in the defense of Western legal and putative
righ t s,'such commitments were meaningless.

Such commit

ments become incredible if there is no response to specific challenges.

^’Tests of wil l” such as Berlin cannot

be met with formal diplomatic protests or solemn assur
ances of U.S. determination.

Soviet probes must be met

with speedy, effective, and continuous countermeasures.
"Upholding one's rights does not raise international
tensions," writes Spanier, "it lowers them because the
test of wills has been successfully met."

1 21

Spanier goes

on to state that the real danger in nuclear blackmail
situations is not a war stemming from a determination to
stand firm, but a war of miscalculation resulting from

weakness"^
American Policy;
Indications of Irresolu
tion, Inaction, and Unwillingness
to Use Force
. In summarizing the performance of the Kennedy
Administration in foreign affairsy I think E. M. "Ted"
D e a l e y , publisher of the Dallas Morning H e w s , has best
described^Kennedy's leadership qualities when after the
^21spanier,

o jd.

c i t ., p. 235 .
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first year of the Administration he told Kennedy to his
face at a meeting in Washington that '^the general opinion
of the grassroots thinking in this country is that you
">”\ i p p

and your Administration are weak sisters. ”j
/*"V\
(Upbn having examined the five international crises,
it remains to answer whether the "subjective factors”
(i.e.» irresolution,
and vacillation)
in these crises„

inaction, unwillingness to use force,

of American foreign policy were present
The answer is that they were.

Kennedy’s

policies in handling these crises not only brought doubt
as to the credibility of our intentions by the constant
reiteration that force would never be used, but his actions
brought doubt to his own capabilities as a national leader.
One of his greatest deficiencies was his "failure to
evolve and adhere to a reasonably consistent philosophy of
foreign relations.”

jn

case of the Cuban invasion,

his handling of the crisis clearly revealed, as Kirk
patrick has said, that the right hand of government did
not know what the left was doing.

Kennedy never really

did make up his mind until it was too late.

He had his

chance to act decisively but he allowed circumstance to
control his choices.

His decisions reveal that he did not

^ ^ T e d Dealey, as quoted in Lasky, _op. c i t .,
p. 533.
^23crabb,

ojd.

cit . ,

p .

449»
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extract power from his choices.
choices serve his influence,,

He failed to make his

He failed because he left

out of account the stakes and risks involved in such a
choice.

He saw the issues through the eyes of his ad

visors.

As a candidate Kennedy had criticized President

Eisenhower for indecisiveness, for lack of candor, for
failure to use the full powers of the office.
Arthur Krock states?

But as

"He repeated every one of the errors

of weakness he attributed to Eisenhower.
<r_j}Take Cuba, he
was indecisive there.

You can't blame advisors: the ulti-

mate responsibility was his.”

12 h- {
1 After the abortive Bay

of Pigs invasion, Kennedy stated that he had learned many
lessons from the venture and he intended to profit from
his mistakes.)

That he hadn't yet learned was hardly the

strongest recommendation for the leadership of the free
world.

Kennedy had not only shied away from his campaign

commitments, but he had failed to exert the strong execu
tive leadership he had so vigorously pledged.

Kennedy

did not carry out a firm and consistent policy in regards
to the Soviet Union and Khrushchev.
fested itself in October 1962.

This mistake mani

The ironical thing about

Kennedy's errors was that even though he was fully aware
^ A r t h u r Krock, as quoted in William Manchester,
Portrait of^a^President (New York:
Little, Brown and
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of them, he seemed incapable of doing anything about them*")
When a reporter remarked in the autumn of 1961 that he
wanted to write a book about the President's first year in
office, Kennedy inquired, "Who would want to read a book
about disasters?"

(Kennedy was particularly lax in
v

learning that a favorable American image in the world can
not be created by speeches not followed by political
action.,

In the international arena, a great power should

not resort to threats unless its leaders are fully pre
pared, without any inner reservations, to back them up
with acts of strength,,
by positive action.]

Credibility can only be strengthened

The Bay of Pigs disaster was "the

worst example of the uses of American power and diplomacy
in this generation."}
In several of the five crises, Kennedy had vio
lated one of the sanctified axioms of foreign policy;
. Foreign policy cannot be conducted without an
awareness of power r e l a t i o n s h i p s V . P o w e r implies force,
and force is the means through which deterrence becomes

^ ^ T o l d by Elie Abel, quoted by I. F. Stone in
New York Review of B o o k s , April 14, 1966, p. 12.
^ % e s t o n , oj). c it., p. 126. See also Jullian
T o w s t e r , "The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.;
Challenge and
Response," Current H i s to ry , XLII (January 1962).
The
author is of the opinion that American foreign policy
has not been effective in the last decade.
^ ^ K is s in g e r,

o p o c i t ., p. 427.

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Poli cy ,
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credible.

Ironically, deterrence strategy was not

strengthened in credibility in the Kennedy Administration
--it was weakened.

The Kennedy Administration based its

deterrence strategy on the pause theory.

This convinced

the Russians that the U.S. lacked faith in its own nuclear
deterrent', i.e., that it did not have the will to use
if)128

^
Instead of emphasizing strengths as deterrence

requires, Kennedy chose to belittle them.

The counter

measures he adopted to respond to Soviet probes of Ameri
can resolve lacked firm resistance and commitment— two
essential components of deterrence strategy.

The most

crucial element of deterrence strategy--credibility--was
continually weakened by President Kenne dy ’s acquiescence
and complacency in carrying out threats or promises to
take action.

Kennedy did not make fulfillment of threats

/
a matter of national honor and prestige in responding to
the Berlin Wall; consequently, American deterrence
\

strategy was weakened).

In Berlin, there was no response,

no action, and no discernible punishment for encroachment
on Western rights.

The U.S. had the power to resist the

change in the status quo in Berlin, but it did not have
the will to use it.
12$See David M. Abshire, "Grand Strategy Recon
structed," in Dulles and Crane, ojd . cit., pp. 250-65.

Vv Cuba, Laos, Vienna, and the Berlin Wall were
Kennedy disasters.

In international affairs the chief

executive must act purposefully and he must take maximum
advantage of national strength.

Kennedy's actions in

these crises did not impart positive images of strength,
resolution, or willingness to use force's

PART II
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICYs

A CHALLENGE TO

AMERICAN POWER 1960-1962

CHAPTER I V

KHRUSHCHEV:: A QUEST FOR POWER

QThe purpose of this chapter is to examine briefly
the politics of Premier Khrushchev.

Such an examination

may be helpful in explaining what led Khrushchev to b e 
lieve he could successfully place missiles in Cubal
The Politics of Premier Khrushchev
Khrushchev was a very able statesman and a skill!

ful politiciano

/His personal and political record demon

strates that he had determination, stubbornness of char1
a ct e r , and considerable political prowess.
He was a
sincere Communist.

Khrushchev was also a shrewd tacti- ,

cian as Dinerstein concludes:

"The Kremlin will continue

to probe political weak spots throughout the world, and
whenever an apparent vacuum appears, will try to fill
/Khrushchev's politics were a blend of Marxism,
Leninism, pragmatism,

Arbors-

opportunism, and, most of all, the

^S’ee Thomas P. Whitney, Khrushchev Speaks (Ann
The University of Michigan Press, 1963) , p . 61 .
p

^Herbert S . Dinerstein, ’’Future Soviet Foreign
Policy,’’ in Abshire and Allen, ojc. c i t ., p. 70.
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pers©nal idiosyncrasies of the man himself).

Merle Fainsod,

a Soviet scholar, has described Khrushchev as "shrewd,
earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncing confi
dence, and a quick if coarse wit, he was the very epitome
of the self-made man in s o c i e t y . Khrushchev was a
master politician besides being a skillful statesman.

He

knew well the art of persuasion, and he used it to his
advantage in his long rise to power as Premier of the
Soviet Union.

His authority, from the very beginning of

his leadership of the Communist Party, appeared to rest on
an underpinning of collective leadership of the Party.
f—
^Khrushchev maintained a tight rein on the Party Secre
tariat and on the apparatus of the Central

Committee.

He

was able to do so both through persuasion and adroit
political maneuvering.

From 1960 to the end of 1962,

"Khrushchev took upon himself the principal role in the
implementation as well as the formation of

policy.”^

Khrushchev’s brand of leadership, as Myron

Rush describes

it, was uniquely "Khrushchevism."5

He was bold, tough,

astute, resourceful, and an agile negotiator for a system
^Merle Fainsod, Khrushchevism in Retrospect,”
Problems of Communism, XIV (January-February 1965)} 1•
^•Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind
(New York:
Praeger, 19 6 3 ), p . 164«
^Myron Rush, "Khrushchev’s Strategic Views"
(Santa Monica, Calif.*
Rand Corporation, Mem. No. P-2$SS,
-June 12, 1962), pp. 1-19o
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which he felt was far superior to any other,\^ Khrushchev
possessed a boundless confidence in the virtue, via"*1b
bil it y, and world destiny of the Soviet way of life;
/Although Khrushchevas politics may have at times seemed
reckless and risky, "he genuinely believed that nuclear
7
war had to be avoided,,” '

But at the same time he firmly

believed that the American position would be slowly
weakened by wars of national liberation^

His words were

strong and suggested boldness, but his moves included a
careful calculation of their effect on his own political
position,,

Khrushchev was also a pragmatic doctrinaire.

His pragmatism operated within the framework of basic
Communist interests in the world.

His pragmatism was

o o bound to Communism, delineated by Communist
ideology and aimed at Communism7s advance,”

$

Khrushchev

was not particularly a revolutionary zealot; he was a
”. . .

supreme politician, a first-class manager of men

and a human dynamo.”

,/Crankshaw goes on to state that

Khrushchev was a man of action, not a thinker; even as a
6s«e Tucker, og. cit., pp. l65~70ff.
^Mark Frankland, Khrushchev (New York?
and Day Publishers, 1967), p« 208.
$
Portrait
more:

Stein

Konrad Kellen, Khrushchev?
A Political
(New York:
Praeger, 1967), p. 24$»

^Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev7s Russia (Balti
Penguin Books, 1962), p. 62.
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man of action he was a politician first, a balancer, an
intriguer, a fixer, an opportunist in the grand manner. \
Khrushchev sought power and he enjoyed it.
rv.

/Although Khrushchev justified his policies in
terms of Marxist legitimacy, he felt free to use any means
possible to him to execute the will of history and the
inevitability of Communism.

10.

Since peaceful coexistence

was a matter of expediency for Khrushchev, he did not
want nuclear war; but he was always ready to take advan
tage of Western mistakes or complacency^

By making ex

cessive and threatening demands and by manufacturing
crises, Khrushchev hoped to extract concessions profit
able to himself.

This was to be done in a piecemeal

fashion if possible.
Khrushchev was a firm believer in a strong military
posture for the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev supported the

policy of strategic missile deterrence, and his tenure as
Premier ” . . .

marked a transformation in military thought

and the military establishment.” ^

In the Soviet Union,

party control over the military is supreme.
remarks:

As Dinerstein

”In the Soviet outlook, military doctrine and

strategy have no independent life of their own.

Both are

^ C f . , Walt W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet
o p . ci t. . p. 1?S-269o
11

Garthoff, op>. c i t ., p. 60,
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understood to be permeated by and subordinate to politics*

. .

12

Soviet policy decisions tend to be poli

tical decisions, and Khrushchev concentrated on weapons
with maximum political effect. /The historical trend in
Russia has been to consider military and political poli
cies before domestic or economic programs, even if the
policies adopted spell economic burdens and sacrifices.
This particular policy-making trend was accelerated during
Khrushchev’s tenure in office,,

The Soviet U n i o n ’s reli-

ance on what Robert Conquest calls ” crash programs”

13

was

typical of Khrushchev’s policies to find quick solutions
to economic problems„
r~j

/In foreign affairs, Khrushchev’s behavior dis
played political aggressiveness and an itch for probing
with extreme military caution,

1Zl

Khrushchev was always

most respectful of American strength.

Soviet policy has

been quick to take advantage of American weaknesses.^,
Khrushchev’s probing policy was based partially on a
”. . .

correct appreciation that the United States
12

V. D. S'okolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy,
trans. Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Gourfe, and Thomas W.
Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.r
Prentice-Hall, 19 6 3 ), p. 6.
^3see Robert Conquest, o j d . ci t., pp. 110-111.
example of one of Khrushchev’s crash programs was the
Virgin Lands project in agriculture.

Brodie,

^ T h i s belief is also expressed by Bernard
c it. , pp. 44-4$.

ojd.

An
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government only wields national power when it is at war
and that it can be persuaded to prefer cold war to hot.”^5
This strategy has proven to be very successful.

’’The

West has still to come up with a coherent and comprehen1!6
sive answer to the Communist ’nibbling process.’” )
Khrushchev monopolized the role of chief architect and

r*'
spokesman for Soviet foreign p o l i c y . ^ /His rule was
characterized by personal diplomacy.
he knew how to extract it.

He sought power and

His policies of intimidation

in 1961 and 1962 increased the W e s t ’s caution;

conse

quently j, Khrushchev was able to gain valuable political
leverage and concessions from the West
Laos),

His control of the Soviet Union during the early

sixties was unchallengeable.
sovereign.

His power was indeed

He alone was the only member of all the chief

organs of dictatorships
tariat,

(e.g., Berlin and

(1 I the Presidium,

(2) Secre

(3) Bureau of the Central Committee, and (4) the

Council of Ministers.

Khrushchev also had the leading

posts in the Party, the government, and the army, being
h . S. Grossman, ’’Reading Khrushchev’s Mind,”
Commentary, XXXII (December 1961), 50$®

l6Robert Strausz-Hupfe, ’’Soviet Strategy,” in
Abshire and Allen, pp. c i t ., p. 13.
1?For one of the most scholarly and authoritative
discussions of Soviet foreign policy, see Triska and
Finley, op. ci t., pp. 50-150ff.
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First Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces.
that was dynamic,

1$

He projected upon the world a Russia

self-confident, and forward-looking,

[He earnestly believed that Communism would triumph over
capitalism and his policies reflected this belief.

"The

Khrushchev era then may be regarded as a transitional
phase of Soviet society moving from an insular, semiindustrial stage into that of a modern, advanced industrial
society with global pretensions to p o w e r . ^ 9
1$
' S e e Myron Rush, "Succession and Institutions in
the Soviet Union," Journal of International Affairs,
XVIII, No. 1 (1964), 71.
^ B e r n a r d S„ Morris, "Soviet Policy Toward the
West," in A, Bromke, The Communist States and the West
(New York:
Praeger, 1967), p. 2$,

CHAPTER V

SOVIET PRE-CRISIS CALCULATIONS

V,This chapter will attempt to provide an explana
tion of and an answer to the following question:.

What

led Khrushchev to believe he could successfully deploy
missiles in Cuba?

In this chapter the hypothesis state™

ment will be examined to determine whether it can provide
an answer to the preceding question*

The first part of

this chapter is a description of Soviet risk-taking and
decision-making„

In the second part, Soviet Leaders5

expectations regarding U *S * response will be evaluated*
The Risk of Thermonuclear War
During the Khrushchev era, Soviet-American rela
tions became an active, indeed, crucial area of Soviet
decision-making *

These were turbulent years in which both

major powers confronted each other in several major
crises*

/Soviet conduct in foreign affairs in these years

was characterized by challenges to American power below
those that might trigger a general nuclear war and, for
that matter, below thresholds of limited war that might
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escalate into general w a r j

The basic characteristic of

this strategy has been supplied by General David Sarnoff,
who called it the "'nibbling process, "jf

This nibbling

process has taken shape in several Communist-launched
forays into the Western Hemisphere (e.g., Cuba and Latin
America),,

These penetrations have, to a great extent,

been based on Soviet calculations of American intentions
and behavior,.

Although such moves have been shrouded in

the ideological rhetoric of "peaceful coexistence," they
have been undertaken with caution.j When perceived gains
from such forays have indicated potential advancement of
Communism,fsoviet leaders have normally been
".

. . always ready to take advantage of Western mistakes

or complacency."3 Q'The Soviet view of American inten
tions

has always been a basic determinant of Soviet

policyWhen

S;oviet leaders have perceived gaps in

American defense policy, they systematically probed at,
them^j

It must be remembered that decision-makers act upon

their images of the situation rather than upon objective
1
f
‘See Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Strategy," in
Abshire and Allen,
c i t . , pp. 9-11 <>
2I b i d ., p . 10.
3R o Stow,

O£o

cit o a p. 262.

^ I b i d „, p . k o
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reality.

5

Whether these gaps or weaknesses were actually

real in the minds of American leaders is not of impor
tance here.

What is important is whether the Soviet

leaders perceived an apparent weakness.

"Once a statesman

has formed an image of an issue, this image acts as an
organizing device for further information and as a filter
through which this information must passj.”^ \ W h e n the
Soviets have perceived weaknesses and discontinuities in
American policy, their perception has stimulated
responses.y

Khrushchev's foreign policy toward the U.S.

was conditioned by the foreign policy and military
strategy of the U.S.

Because the international system is

composed of actors and nations performing and interacting
with one another, Soviet shifts in attitude may be ex
plained as responses to American positions or behavior.
These responses were based on certain perceptions held by
Khrushchev, and as Stagner has stated, " . . .
precedes the policy decision and shapes it."

perception

S

Historical analysis has proven that the Russians,

5For a detailed discussion of image formation in
foreign policy, see Holsti, pp. c i t ., pp. 244-45ff°
■ ^Stagner, pp. cit ., p. 15»
^Triska and Finley document this point very well
in their book Soviet Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 144350.
$

Stagner, op. cit., p. 11.

being doctrinaire acti vi st s,jare relentless in securing
all possible changes favorable to them so long as no
Q
undue risks are involved„
Khrushchev’s behavior in Cuba
in 1962 has been incorrectly described as reckless, ir
rational, emotional, adventuristic, scheming, and perfi
dious „

While he did accept some unusually high military

and political risks in embarking on the Cuban venture,
the risk of an immediate U „ S „ thermonuclear response
against the Soviet Union was almost certainly not one of
them0

Khrushchev established a very crucial upper limit

on the risks he was willing to a c c e p t . /"There were risks,
of courseo

The Soviet marshals most certainly pointed

them out to hinu

10
’’But he knew Kennedy? they did not.”5'

The Soviet Union was no more anxious to precipitate a
nuclear war than was the United States,,

Moreover, the

Soviets have always subordinated military operations to
political objectives=

Clearly, Khrushchev’s goals did

not warrant the resort to nuclear war which would have
placed in jeopardy the future of Communism not only in
Cuba but perhaps also in the Soviet Union,,

/’’There can be

no doubt that Khrushchev personally had no intention of
letting the crisis deteriorate to a point where a nuclear

^See Brodie, o p „ cit „, pp„ 75-85«
^Abel,

0£o c i t „, p„ 40„
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t|

war became even likely; let alone inevitable,”^
/Throughout the last fifteen y e a r s , the Soviet
Union has displayed a preference for low-risk ventures
in foreign policy,,

1?

The successes the Soviets have had

have been in part the result of Western errors (e,g»,
Cuba),

The successes were also well balanced by Soviet

retreats forced by effective resistance abroad to Soviet
pressures (e.g„, Iran, Greece, Berlin, Yugoslavia),

The

Berlin crisis in 1961 is a good example of what Klaus
Knorr would refer to as caution in Soviet foreign policy:
"The Soviet government, which initiated this crisis, in
creased the pressure step by step, taking discriminating
care that no new move was apt to provoke a violent
r e s p o n s e I n

Cuba, Khrushchev believed the U.S, would

not strike without cause, and he believed he could control
the risks and would not press a challenge that would

^Frankland,

ojd,

cit „, p, 194„

12s?ee Triska and Finley, ojd, c i t ,, p, 312,
"Risk is a liability to error; it is a function of pos
sible change.
Risk involves a level of uncertainty.
Where no prediction of the outcome is possible, pure
change is involved; this, however, is not the usual situ
ation in international relations.
Here, one can at least
broadly define the limits of possible gain or loss. When
uncertainty is involved, it is a function of experience;
if many cases are involved, a statistical probability may
be calculated.
Risk then becomes objectified uncertainty”
(po 31$).
^ K l a u s Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in
the Nuclear A g e , o p , ci t, , p, 91 o
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provoke the U.S'. into taking aggressive a c t i o n . ^

The

costs involved in Khrushchev's risk calculus were minimal
compared to the possible gains that might have been
achieved had the deployment been successful,,

Soviet risk-

taking and risk-calculation was a product of rational
behavior„j Relying on William Riker's definition of
rationality— " in politics rational men are men who would
rather win than lose, regardless of the particular
stakes"^

can be seen that Khrushchev's risk-taking in

Cuba did anticipate a win but this initial risk action was
coupled w ith an automatic risk-reducing mechanism,
t^Putting missiles in Cuba was a high-risk action.

But it

was combined with what Triska calls a "risk-reducing
emergency strategy” ?
we pull out.
pull ou t0"16

"If the United States gets tough,

The U.S. got tough, and the Russians did
(Nobody consciously enters into a risk

situation without calculating what to do if the situation
should escalate.

Khrushchev was a determined but con-

trolled, forward-moving but cautious leader.)

Risk-reducing

1ifC f . , for example, Roger Hilsman, Foreign Policy
in the Sixties (Baltimore:- Johns Hopkins Press, 1965)?
pp. 5-7.
^ W i l l i a m Riker, The Theory of Political Coali
tions (New Haven, Conn.?
Yale University Press, 1 962);,
p o 22 o
^ T r i s k a and Finley, op. cit „ , p. 322.
See
also Even Luard, "Conciliation and Deterrence," World
Politics, XII (January 1967)°
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strategy in the Soviet Union is synonymous with retreat
ing,, ^Retreating is a normal behavior under certain con
ditions o

Retreating is not necessarily seen as the

result of prior mistakes, but as an act of preservation,
as a condition of future advance.

Soviet policy is

probing and exploratory but essentially conservative and
ready to withdraw in the face of hostile d e t e r m i n a t i o n . ^
The Cuban gambit is the best example of Khrushchev’s
initial challenge to U.S'. resolve; and the subsequent
retreat was a useful political tool involving little risk.
Khrushchev’s behavior during the crisis was cautious,
conservative, and circumspect.

When the U.S.. got tough,

Khrushchev hastily and even ignominiously removed the
missilesSurely,

the circumstances of that removal

qualify one ’s estimate of his boldness in putting the
missiles in.

18 P""

placing of missiles in Cuba was not

an imprudent, reckless, or irrational gamble.

On the

contrary, as Herbert Dinerstein remarks:

^ S e e Leites, ojo. ci t. , pp. 24-29; and John S.
Reshetar, Jr., ’’Predicting Soviet Behavior,” in Alvin
Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union
(Princeton, N . J . : Princeton University Press, 1966),
p. 427.
°Bernard Brodie presents somewhat similar re
marks, while contending that the Russian action in Cuba
was indeed a manageable risk-taking situation (pp. 4055) o

144
I would not characterize the Cuban attempt by
the Soviet Union as a reckless gamble.
I would,
if I were writing about it, I think, five years
from now, give them very high marks for good sense.
After all, the problem for the Soviet Union is how
to advance Communism. c
P
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The gains they would have acquired from such a
success would have been enormous politically and
not negligible militarily.
What have they lost?
Well, t h e y ’ve lost a lot of prestige; they d i d n ’t
get what they wanted, but they haven’t had to re
treat from anything they had before.19

-

As past events and crises have revealed, Soviet calcula
tion of risk relates to their calculation of U.S. resolve.
”If they calculate that [U.S.] resolve is low, and if it
is in fact low in a given crisis, they face low actual
risk, although the risk may appear high.”^
/Given the considerable margin of American stra
tegic superiority prior to the Cuban crisis, which the
emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was intended to
reduce, on what grounds could the Soviet leaders be con
fident that the U.S. would not launch a first strike
against the Soviet Union in order to prevent an unfavor
able change in the strategic balance?)

f"

The primary grounds for this confidence were

political.

Even when the U.S. enjoyed decisive strategic

^ H e r b e r t Dinerstein, ’’Discussion,” Part I,” as
quoted in Abshire and Allen, _op. c i t ., p. 200.
^O fb i d ., Preface article entitled "Soviet
Strategy:
Risk of General Nuclear W a r . ” See also Herbert
Dinerstein, "Future Soviet Foreign Policy,”' _ojd . cit.,
pp. 21-27.
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superiority, as during the Kennedy Administration, its
leaders showed themselves to be strongly disinclined to
initiate general war so long as the Soviet Union avoided
extreme measures of provocation that could not be dealt
with by other m e a n s »

Increasingly, it appeared to the

Soviet Union and Premier Khrushchev that nothing short of
actual application of violence against the U „S . or an
important U.S. ally would risk a nuclear attack on the
S I
Soviet Unionoj |If one excludes from Soviet pre-crisis
calculations any serious concern that the U.S. would
launch a thermonuclear attack against the Soviet Union,
the Cuban gambit no longer appears to be a reckless,
irreational scheme, but a calculated and limited risk
O1
undertaken for substantially attractive gains.
The
S o v ie ts f attempt to deploy missiles in Cuba was a very
oo\ J

rTsensible risk."_ jCAnd furthermore,

"to ship such missiles

to Cuba ," writes Knorr., "'required months of complicated
Thomas Schelling might equate this risk calcu
lation to the game of chicken.
As long as calculations
involve a series of discrete steps taken deliberately,
without uncertainty as to the immediate consequences,
this process of military maneuver does not lead to war.
If the threatening side knows how far the other side can
be pushed, he does not push that far.
See Schelling,
"Uncertainty, Brinkmanship, and the Game of Chicken," in
K. Archibald, Strategic Interaction and Conflict
(Berkeley:
Institute of International Studies, 1966),
pp. 75-86.
^ D i n e r s t e i n , "Discussion, Part I," in Abshire
and Allen, op. c i t ., p. 200.
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preparation--a requirement that is not conducive to a
strong component of emotional or irrational decision
making."^

To Khrushchev the possibility of escalation

of the crisis was not negligible!

But as the crisis

revealed, his calculations included a risk-reducing
strategy. Tin fact, the quick withdrawal of the missiles
may be interpreted as a decision to end the crisis
quickly before it became necessary to accept even greater
losses which could be avoided--only at the cost of facing
\

serious risk of nuclear wary
Expectations Regarding United States
Response
jConfidence that their action would not directly
provoke nuclear war was a prerequisite for embarking on
the Cuban missile venture, but it could not be a suffi
cient condition for success.

What, then, aside from

their belief that the U,S, would not respond by striking
the Soviet Union, were the calculations that led
Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders to believe their venture
could succeed?]
^Undoubtedly, the subjective factors of American

23Rlaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelli
gence Estimates" The Case of Cuban Missiles," World
Politics, XVI (April 1963), 463; and see also Roberta
Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," Foreign Affairs,
XLIII (July 1965), 694-705o
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foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc convinced Khrushchev
and the Soviet leaders that the U.S. would not respond
with military force to the creation of an offensive missile base in Cuba,./ (Khrushchev* s action in deploying mis
siles in Cuba can be explained as a product of a rational
anticipation of American acquiescence to a fait accompli,
based on a reasonable interpretation of a succession of
American actions (e.g.., Bay of Pigs, Laos, Vienna, and
the Berlin Wall) and American responses to these actions.
Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba was based on a eareful analysis of American responses to Soviet pressure.

2Zl

And furthermore, the placing of missiles in Cuba was con
ceived of as a limited probe of American deterrence
strategy to prove that the U.S. threshold of response,
both tactical and strategic, was high even in an area
where the U . S . had overwhelming military superiority and
where the Soviet Union had no vital interests to make
defeat unacceptable.j

(As this study has developed, the Soviets have
based their policies for many years on cold calculation)'
rather than on fear and recklessness^) and have taken
advantage of whatever weakness, vacillation, or tenden
cies,toward accommodation under pressure they detected in
2^For further explanation, see Crane, 0£. cit.,
p. 531 .

us

U»S. foreign policy.

Khrushchev’s assessment of Presi

dent Kennedy’s expected behavior in Cuba was

. . based

largely on expediential calculations and the rational
working nout
of plans.
„
|In foreign affairs, the Kennedy Administration had
demonstrated incredible naivete.

Kennedy had come into

office, hoping that the Soviet Union and Khrushchev would
be more tractable in dealing with the Administration.

In

fact, the President had even sent Khrushchev a personal
message, asking him to give his new Administration a
six-months’ reprieve from crises in which to formulate new
policies designed to reach a modus vivendi with the
Soviet Union.

This turned out to be a terrible ’’diplo

matic blunder.”^6

This action convinced Khrushchev that

the new President and his Administration were unsure of
themselves and the time was ripe for some heavy-handed
probing tacticsl?
~s*4
Khrushchev and Soviet leaders, according to Lowe,
. . follow American strategic pronouncements very
closely and understand clearly the crucial semantic
nuances.

. . .’’2?

’’The mere fact,’’ writes Kissinger, ’’that

25Myron Rush, Khrushchev’s Strategic V i e w s , o p . ci t.,
p. 4e
26see Lasky, ojc. c i t . , p. 5 6 8 .
^ G e o r g e Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1965), p. 238.
~
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thefWest constantly feels constrained to emphasize that
V
a nuclear conflict is unthinkable may raise serious
questions about its resolve to resort to the chief
— \P $

strategy at its disposal,,”)
/\
^Premier Khrushchev’s understanding of U.S. Cuban
policy was a major factor in his decision to send mis
siles to Cuba*

The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion attempt

of April 1961 s while demonstrating the depths of U.S.
hostility toward Castro, also suggested to Khrushchev that
President Kennedy’s reluctance to engage its own forces
directly in military action against Cuba was so great that
even the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons on the
island would be tolerated, or at least resisted by means
short of direct use of U.S. armed forces.*^

’’Unquestion

ably, Khrushchev was astonished at our failure to carry
through the . * * i n v a s i o n K h r u s h c h e v

had studied

the events at the Bay of Pigs; he would have understood
if Kennedy had left Castro alone or destroyed him; but
od
Kissinger, The Necessity for Choi ce , o p . c i t .,

p. 14 o
^ T h i s particular expectation was based on the
U.S. proven inability to use its power— i.e., its lack
of will and skill to employ various techniques of coer
cion available to it.
Such examples are Laos, Berlin
Wall, and American-Cuban relations.
See Horelick,
o p . c i t ., pp. 35-38; also Lowenthal, erg. c i t ., pp. 63-64«
30James Burnham, ’’The Gentle Khrushchev,”
National R e v i e w , XIII (December 31> 196?)> 505»
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,/when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba but not
bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided he was
dealing with an "inexperienced young man who could be
intimidated and blackmailed*"3^
stated:

As Robert Strausz-Hupe

’’Premier Khrushchev expanded gleefully on the

W e s t ’s failure of nerve*’’-^

Kennedy’s action in Cuba

demonstrated to Khrushchev that the President
". * * lacked resolve and would not take determined
action * * ."33 against a challenge to its hegemony in a
vital area*

The great cost of non-involvement when U,S.„

core interests are threatened is projected onto the world
as an indication of U„S„ impotence and indecisiveness in
her own backyard.

Khrushchev was more than willing to

take advantage of such irresolution,,

His own nerve had

not failed when it became necessary to send tanks into
Budapest on November 4, 1956, to throttle the revolution*
Kennedy had not lifted a finger to crush Castro*

To

T

Khrushchev, the dilemma was clear:

’’The Americans cer

tainly possess overwhelming power--but they have forgotten
how a great power must behave
3lReston, crp. cit * , p* 24°
32strausz-Hupe, "Reflections on the Quarter,"
o p * c i t * , p* 505 *
33stoessinger, op* cit *, p* 165 ; and Plank,
0£* cit., p. 34.
34Abel, ap° cit *, p* 36 .
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penetration of Cuba was rather unexpected0

"It was

greatly stimulating, it was even a little intoxicating,
to see a Communist regime amazingly established within
35
a stone’s throw of the American mainland."
rv.
fTne Kennedy Administration’s acceptance of in
creasingly open Soviet involvement in Cuban affairs after
the Bay of Pigs incident, including particularly the
Soviet military involvement, strengthened the belief of
Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders that the U.S. would
engage in armed intervention only in response to the
actual use of Cuba-based weapons against some Western
Hemisphere country
• ~ - o

A few weeks after the abortive Cuba invasion,
Soviet leaders were further enlightened regarding
American foreign policy when President Kennedy met with
Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and prepared the way
for the neutralization of Laos (i.e., virtual abandonment
of Laos to C o m m u n i s m ) T h
e
\

Kremlin’s belief that the

Kennedy Administration was merely a "paper tiger" was re
affirmed by the President’s loud threats to intervene in
35Frankland, ap„ c i t „, p 0 2S1 ; see also Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in L 0A.„," _op0 c i t ., p. £4; and
M o s e l y , ojd„ cif „, pp„ 66-67®
3%'ee Horelick, _op0 cit », pp. 37-3&ff®
3?See the discussion in Reiman Morin, "Days That
Shocked the World," The Washington S t a r , November 6,

1962

„
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Laos and its later inaction,,
At Vienna, Khrushchev had bullied Kennedy over
the Bay of Pigs defeat*

Kennedy called it a mistake.

Khrushchev saw it as evidence of "weakness and indecision."^l

From Khrushchev5s point of view, this meeting

was in no way a climacteric; it was no more than a useful
exploration.

Khrushchev went to Vienna

. .to

see

this young man [Kennedy] with the toothpaste-advertisement
smile and youthful head of hair.

^He needed to decide

whether he really was a president or only a personable
figure manipulated by unseen hands~-and, if so, whose
h a n d s . "39

In Vienna, Khrushchev did not deliberately set

out to be unpleasant or b e l l i g e r e n t . ^
was a young man in a hurry he could see.

That the President
Upon the end of

the meetings, Khrushchev was unable to determine what
Kennedy believed;

if indeed he believed anything at all.

Khrushchev left the encounter convinced he could get away

3^01eg V. Penkovskii, The Penkovskii P ap e r s ,
introduction and commentary by Frank Gibney, foreword by
Edward Crankshaw, trans. Peter Deriabin (Garden City,
N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1965)? P»
3 ^Crankshaw, Khrushchev, o p . c i t . , p. 27$.
^ K h r u s h c h e v was simply being himself in the '
encounter.
His successes in the last few years had given
him tremendous confidence that his mental and physical
powers were adequate to almost any crisis that he might
face.
These successes had made him extremely bold.
Khrushchev5s strategy was simpler he sought to confront
and encounter his antagonist.
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with some daring move*

President Kennedy had failed to

exert himself; he had confused Western policy at a time
when firmness and resolute diplomacy were necessary!^
?

A joint communique issued at the end of the
Vienna meetings described them as frank, courteous, and
/V.

useful.

But useful to whom?

/From the President’s view

point, the meeting had f a i l e d .
Kennedy as a ’pushover.’
negative results.\

"Khrushchev had sized up

The meeting had totally

"Khrushchev concluded we are people

who first shake our fists, then shake our fingers, and
then shake our heads

jfhrushchev had walked away

quite confident from the Vienna meeting.

Later, it was

reported on the diplomatic circuit that Khrushchev had
boasted to the East Germans, ”1 think that I have taught
that young man what fear i s f ' ^ j
(The American acquiescence over the Berlin Wall was
interpreted by Khrushchev as confirming his estimate of
Kennedy’s unwillingness to use force to protect vital
American interests and rights.

Kennedy had

„ „ ignored

the provocation of the construction of the Berlin W a l l . " ^ ^•iLasky, op. pit. , p. 571°
^ H e n r y J. Taylor, Reporter, U.S. Hews & World
as cited in Lasky, pp. c i t ., p. 571°
^3premier Khrushchev, as quoted in Lasky,
o p . ci t., po 571 .
^ L e u c h t e n b u r g , pp. c i t ., p. 20.
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^Khrushchev had taken measure of President
Kennedy5s determination and resolution and found them
incredible.

The lesson Khrushchev had drawn was that the

U.S. talked loudly but carried a small s t i c k . ^

On

September 9th, a few weeks before the Cuban crisis,
Khrushchev told Robert Frost that the "modern liberals"
in the U.S. were "too liberal to f i g h t . I n

the Cuban

crisis, as past American behavior had demonstrated,
"Khrushchev did indeed have ground for believing that the
rx
U.S. would not act.'J
(On October 16th, just a few days
before the beginning of the open phase of the Cuban
crisis, Khrushchev told Kekkonen of Finland that he was
"absolutely convinced" that the U.S. would never fight
over Berlin, Cuba, or anything else.'^

Premier Khrushchev

had calculated that the U.S. would consult its allies,
who would urge caution to bring the case before the
United Nations, and the United Nations would decide in
--"in

favor of Cuba and the Soviet Union. \
—

>

^5See Spanier, ojp. cit . , pp. 234-37.
Crane, op. cit., pp. 531-32; also James Burham,
o p . c i t ., p. 505.
^ A l e x a n d e r Dallin, "What Happened in the
Kremlin," N e w s w e e k , LX (November 23, 1962), 25.
^ % e e Crane, ojd. ci t. , p. 536; also interview
with Alexander Dallin in Newsweek,, November 12, 1962.
49C f ., Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intel
ligence Estimates," o p . c i t . , p. 4 6 5 .
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The subjective factors of American foreign policy
had indeed convinced Khrushchev that the U.S. would not
respond with force to the creation of an offensive mis
sile base in Cuba.

Khrushchev had long since come to

the conclusion that President Kennedy’s lack of experi
ence and his tendency to temperorize could be safely
exploited„
Khrushchev had become convinced that the Kennedy
Administration would not run risks to protect its inter
ests, either because it did not understand its interests
or because it did not have the will to use its power,
■"'Kennedy's behavior in handling the five international
crises and the damaging effects these defeats had on
American deterrence strategy

. . led the Soviet

leaders to the conviction that given a face-saving for
mula, the United States would choose retreat rather than
"co
a head on confrontation,” j
The Kennedy Administration
had precipitated the crisis by its own actions--according
to Thomas Schelling when he referred to the President's
conduct in foreign affairs:

"No service is done to the

other side by behaving in a way that undermines his belief
in o n e ’s ultimate firmness,’’^

^Sometime after the crisis,

5 % e n r y A. Kissinger, "Reflections on Cuba,"
R e p o r t e r , XXVTI (November 22, 1962),, 22.
51 Thomas Schelling, "Uncertainty, Brinksmanship,
and the Game of Chicken," as quoted in Archibald,
o p , c i t », p. $7.
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Dean Acheson was asked why the Russians had put the mis
siles in Cuba.

His answer was anything but flattering

to his own government.

He said that the Russians had been

led to believe that they could get away with ite^ J
5^S:
:
ee Abel, op. cit., p. 113? for full text of
conversation Acheson was having with Charles DeGaulle.

CONCLUSION
The discussion of the deterrence model as devel
oped in Chapter I and analyzed in Chapter III has proven
to be a useful theoretical tool.

Not only has it served

as an explanatory model but it has also helped provide
some of the answers to the questions this thesis has
attempted to reso l ve .
Similar to any theoretical model, the deterrence
model has flaws.

It cannot truly represent a valid

interpretation of reality.

It is only an approximation.

Does this fact negate its usefulness?

It does not.

If

a theoretical model helps us understand the internal
logic between cause and effect and the interrelated vari
ables in any event, crisis, o r ’social phenomena, it has
served its purpose.
The analysis of the deterrence model in Chap
ter III has, it is hoped, brought added understanding to
the cause and effect relationships involved in the Cuban
missile crisis.

Deterrence, like all political phenomena,

is not likely to operate as a strict law or principle.
However, it does have a consistent and logical core.

And,

as Kissinger has stated, deterrence is either effective or
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it is not. C l n the case of the Kennedy Administration,
deterrence was not effective; in fact, it failed.

It

failed not so much because of any weakness in the deter
rence model.

Its failure can be attributed more to the

frailties and insufficiencies of men and their use of
national power than to the deterrence model^>
(The evaluation of the deterrence model has not
only demonstrated the disastrous outcomes when deterrence
strategy is not implemented effectively, but it has also
indicated several inherent weaknesses in the use of
nuclear power.

These weaknesses, as Morgenthau expressed

them, are the four paradoxes of nuclear power: the commit
ment to the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, paralyzed
by the fear of having to use it; the search for a nuclear
strategy which would avoid the predictable consequences
of nuclear war; the pursuit of a nuclear armaments race
joined with attempts to stop it; and the pursuit of an
alliance policy which the availability of nuclear weapons
has rendered obsolete".'-,
This does not mean that we should abandon deter
rence strategy; only that we should consider realistically
the use of force and power when such correct and effective
action serves our policy goals.

The United States can

not afford to find itself at the mercy of events.

It

must anticipate the danger and shape a firm and consistent
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policy to meet it.

Fulfillment of threats and obliga

tions is a matter of national honor and prestige.

Power

and influence are the means of facilitating deterrence,
and ” . . .

they share the role of being the means par

excellence of foreign policy."^
d e t e r r e n c e requires a combination of power, the
will to use it, and the assessment of these by the poten
tial aggressor.

If force is necessary to avert a serious

crisis to demonstrate our determination to apply our
military superiority as may be necessary to protect our
interests, and those of our allies, its use s h o u l d <be con
sidered.

Since deterrence

the power to dissuade--the

is a form of power relation—
use of force may be

necessary

to affirm compliance with one's own a c t i o n s ^
(A basic presumption of this thesis has been that
the origins and possible avoidance of conflicts are not
in final acts, but in decisions taken or not taken day
by day over long periods of time. (^A crisis occurs as
the result of failure of decision-making at much earlier
stages
This thesis has attempted to verify the above
presumption by examining the origins of the Cuban missile
crisis.

The successful mediation of the crisis during

October 1962 does not free
^See supr a, p. 37,

usfrom the need to
n. 42.

understand
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how the U.S'. arrived at the point where such dramatic
and risky action was necessary,,

This writer has found

the explanations of the events leading up to the crisis
partially unclear and unanswered; and it is hoped that
this research has at least brought some clarity and
understanding to the problems involved,
(~The Cuban missile crisis was not an episodic
event.
War.

The crisis was unique in the history of the Cold
Ole Holsti best depicted its momentous character

when he sals?

"The Cuban crisis surpassed all previous

cold war confrontations and, for that matter, any pre
vious in histor
(We cannot dispute the fact that Khrushchev mis
calculated American behavior and response during the
actual crisis of October 1962.
is:

Why did he miscalculate?

But the important question
He miscalculated because

the credibility of American deterrence strategy had been
so thoroughly weakened by Kennedy’s words and actions
that the deployment of missiles not only seemed to involve
few risks but also Khrushchev believed no response would
be forthcoming.

Khrushchev’s action was due in no small

part from Kennedy’s failure to demonstrate effective
executive l e a d e r s h i p ^
(If there is one distinguishing feature that

^Holsti, Brody, and North, as cited in Rosenau,
o p . c i t . , p. 6 & 3 «
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characterized the Kennedy Administration,

it was the dis

sociation of military power and national policy.

In the

Kennedy Administration, foreign policy was in a state of
constant confusion.

There was a discrepancy between what

the Administration preached and what it practiced.

Up

until the Cuban crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy
failed to utilize military power as a rational and effec
tive instrument of national policy.

The Kennedy Adminis

tration not only hesitated and vacillated in the face of
Soviet blandishments, but also before Soviet intransigence^
(The Soviet probes of American resolve that have
been discussed in this study found the Kennedy Adminis
tration debating their implications when quick counter
measures were required.

President Kennedyrs behavior and

strategy in foreign affairs doomed the U.S. to an essen
tially reactive policy that produced improvised counter
moves.

The result of these conditions is that American

foreign policy tends to be defensive in nature.

Such a

policy leads to the depreciation of national powerr)
In order for the U.S. to employ power as a
rational and effective instrument of national policy, it
must first have a foreign policy that is defined in terms
appropriate to power.

The Kennedy Administration demon

strated its reluctance to think in terms of power; the
consequences were indeed costly (e.g., weakened deterrence
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strategy,

inefficacious threats, Cuban missile crisis). *

We

Kennedy Administration was preoccupied with

two extreme levels of objectives:

(1) the level of

technical performance of deterrence strategy, and (2) the
level of philosophical generalities concerning the
highest levels of mankind.

President Kennedy used power

almost shamefacedly, as if it were inherently wicked.
Not only was deterrence strategy weakened by such be 
havior, but also the credibility factor and national
power were greatly depreciated.''"^
As earlier discussed, deterrence strategy has a
logical core.

If we ask whom will deterrence strategy

deter, the answer must be only £hose w ^° play the game.
QXeterrence deters only so long as both aggressor and
deterrer know the game thoroughly and act out their roles
accordingly.

It is questionable whether President Kennedy

knew the game thoroughly or that he acted out his role in
foreign policy leadership in the most effective fashion^
( if a President is going to administer foreign
policy to protect and guard his personal power, he must
understand"that power.

He must thoroughly understand

power relationships and how they affect his personal influ
ence and power.

He must always be aware of the risks

involved in using power and how decisions and choices
will affect his power.

It is doubtful whether Kennedy
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in the Bay of Pigs disaster ever seriously weighed and
considered the damaging effect the fiasco would have on
his personal power and influence.
after the incident.

He realized this

The President must always weigh the

risks, both costs and gains, in pursuing a certain
policy.

The President protects his power, as best he

can, when he appraises the effects of the present action
on the sources of his power.

To make decisions with in

sight, the President must have learned to know himself
and to master his identity.

Perhaps one of the greatest

failures of the Kennedy Administration was its inability
to decide what it was doing and where it was going in the
realm of foreign affairs.
logical question:

Such statements beget the next

Was President Kennedy able to master

his own identity and principles of government in the White
House?

This study has revealed that he did not. ")
(Many writers have written that the Kennedy Admin

istration, and particularly the President, finally ex
hibited determination and direction by facing-down the
Communist challenge in Cuba in October 1962.

The success

ful removal of the offensive missiles has been hailed as
a Western victory and a defeat for the Soviet Union.
can hardly agree with such statements.

I

Not only were the

Communists handed a privileged sanctuary in the Western
Hemisphere, but they also were given a mno invasion” pledge
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by the Kennedy Administration.

I do not consider this a

victory but a grave, tragic consequence of the total in
eptness and bungling of U.S. foreign policy in the Carib
bean.

If the Sbviet leaders were surprised at U.S. firm

ness in handling the Cuban missile crisis, they were
further confused by the failure of the U.S. to take advan-.
tage of its superior strategic position.

The Kennedy

Administration wanted only the return of the status quo;
it did not even get that.
The modern liberalism of the Kennedy Administration
favored discussion, negotiation, and compromise as the
only rational and acceptable method of settling disputes.
It rejected the use of coercion and force,,
Cuba is indeed an American tragedy.
it is a Kennedy tragedy.'^

Furthermore,
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